Steel is a metallic alloy primarily composed of iron and carbon. Used since antiquity, it has become a fundamental structural material due to its mechanical strength, durability, and recyclability. It is now employed in a wide range of sectors: construction and civil engineering, automotive, aeronautics, rail, defense, and energy. Through its usage, steel is strategic to any industrial policy. It also played a historical role through the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on April 18, 1951, the first cornerstone of European integration. <\/p>\n
Among the ten largest steel producers in the world, six are Chinese groups. However, the second place in the ranking is held by ArcelorMittal. The latter was born in 2006 from the merger between the European group Arcelor and the company Mittal Steel. Arcelor itself resulted from the 2002 merger of three major European steel groups: Usinor (France), Arbed (Luxembourg), and Aceralia (Spain). <\/p>\n
However, by coming under Indian ownership, Arcelor has evolved to now act against French and European interests. The work of CR451, particularly the deindustrialization risk index, aims to demonstrate that the loss of control over the governance and capital of a French industrial group poses risks to employment and the maintenance of production capacities in our country. ArcelorMittal is a perfect illustration of this. Indeed, through a policy of economic warfare, ArcelorMittal has successfully implemented an influence strategy to divert a complex regulatory environment to its advantage (Part 1). The group has also, through information asymmetry, brought several territories under its influence using employment blackmail (Part 2). Finally, ArcelorMittal has successfully used the weapon of law and lawfare<\/em> to contain any challenges, particularly from its competitors or partners (Part 3). <\/p>\n In the globalized economy, the performance of a transnational corporation depends in part on its ability to interact with the normative framework in which it operates. This dimension falls under economic intelligence (EI), which includes an organization’s capacity to anticipate, adapt to, and influence public decisions to maintain or increase its competitive advantage[1]<\/a>. <\/p>\n One of the central concepts of this dynamic is “regulatory capture” (regulatory capture<\/em>[2]<\/a>), namely the ability to steer the decisions of a regulatory authority to one’s advantage, often through information asymmetry or a strong presence in technical expertise circles.<\/p>\n The steel industry constitutes an interesting analytical framework for this phenomenon, as this highly strategic sector faces major decarbonization imperatives, transnational competition, and heavy infrastructure financing. In 2023, the ArcelorMittal group, which is the leading European producer, recorded emissions of approximately 100 million tonnes of CO2<\/sub>[3]<\/a>, equivalent to the emissions of Belgium[4]<\/a>. <\/p>\n While the company has publicly committed to achieving carbon neutrality by 2050[5]<\/a>, the reality of the group’s practices reveals an economic warfare policy targeting French and European normative frameworks as its primary objective.<\/p>\n This report proposes an objective analysis of the strategy deployed by ArcelorMittal to reconcile its financial profitability imperatives with climate regulatory constraints. It is structured around three axes: the evolution of the group’s governance and shareholding, an analysis of its investment policy and management of public aid, and finally, an analytical synthesis of the sovereignty challenges raised by this capture strategy at the French and European levels. <\/p>\n Analyzing the relationship between ArcelorMittal and European states requires taking into account the company’s shareholding composition and governance structure, which determine its strategic priorities.<\/p>\n The year 2006 marked a crucial turning point with the acquisition of Arcelor by Mittal Steel. Arcelor was then the result of the consolidation of several historic European steel players (Usinor in France, Arbed in Luxembourg, Aceralia in Spain). This public takeover bid transferred control of the leading European steel player to a group with a predominantly non-European shareholding. Since this operation, the strategic decision-making center has followed global optimization logics rather than strictly national or European industrial policies. <\/p>\n ArcelorMittal’s shareholding structure is characterized by a high concentration of decision-making power. According to data as of March 31, 2026, the founding Mittal family holds, through a trust, 43.81% of the issued shares and 44.56% of the voting rights. The remainder of the capital is distributed among global institutional investors, such as BlackRock (approximately 5%)[6]<\/a>. <\/p>\n The Board of Directors reflects this structure: Lakshmi N. Mittal serves as Executive Chairman, Aditya Mittal holds the position of Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and other family members sit on the Board. The company proposed to renew these mandates at the General Meeting in May 2026[7]<\/a>. <\/p>\n <\/strong>1.3. The Primacy of Financial Rationality<\/strong><\/p>\n This capital configuration implies that the management of industrial assets primarily meets the profitability requirements of financial markets and the private interests of the Mittal family. Choices regarding capital allocation, the continuation of operations at sites, or reorganization are made by taking into account the competitiveness of each global region. This financial logic allows the group to easily adjust its production in Europe according to variations in energy costs or regulatory standards[8]<\/a>. <\/p>\n <\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n ArcelorMittal’s strategy is based on optimizing environmental regulatory frameworks, negotiating public co-financing for its investments, and adjusting its geographical exposure based on market constraints.<\/p>\n In France, ArcelorMittal is established at major industrial sites, such as Dunkirk and Fos-sur-Mer, which are among the country’s largest CO2<\/sub> emitters. To support the transition toward cleaner production methods\u2014notably direct reduced iron and electric arc furnaces\u2014the State has released substantial aid. <\/p>\n Thus, in July 2023, the European Commission approved public aid of 850 million euros for the Dunkirk site, as part of the “France 2030” plan managed by ADEME. This sum was to be added to a global investment of 1.7 billion euros[9]<\/a>. The development of these new facilities also required public investment in infrastructure, notably a reinforcement of the electricity grid by RTE estimated at 340 million euros[10]<\/a>. <\/p>\n However, a parliamentary report from June 2025, led by MP Carlos Martens Bilongo, pointed to an imbalance in these negotiations. It reveals that the State gave its financial green light even before the socio-economic impact study was finalized (completed in the first quarter of 2025) and notes a lack of transparency regarding the social guarantees expected in return[11]<\/a>. <\/p>\n In a context of slowing European demand, ArcelorMittal announced at the end of 2024 the suspension of this decarbonization project. In April 2025, the group presented a workforce adjustment plan providing for the elimination of more than 608 positions in France[12]<\/a>. This decision, justified by management by a lack of competitiveness, generated significant social movements at the end of 2025. <\/p>\n The group’s investment choices are monitored by several economic observers, who study the distribution between shareholder remuneration and the financing of the ecological transition.<\/p>\n According to SteelWatch[13]<\/a>, between 2021 and 2024, the group generated approximately 32.6 billion in operational cash flow<\/em> but reportedly devoted only 800 million euros to its decarbonization[14]<\/a>. In parallel over the last five years, the group reportedly redistributed 12.5 billion dollars to its shareholders (1.5 billion dollars in dividends and 11 billion dollars in share buybacks) according to the bill proposed by MP Aur\u00e9lie Trouv\u00e9[15]<\/a>. <\/p>\n This policy of returning value to shareholders continued for the 2025 financial year with the distribution of a dividend of 0.55 dollars per share compared to 0.50 in 2024, representing a 10% increase[16]<\/a>. The group’s Board of Directors has also proposed a dividend of 0.60 dollars per share for 2026. <\/p>\n An expert report commissioned by the group’s central social and economic committee (CSEC), published at the end of 2025, noted that the job cuts in France aimed for savings of around 37 million euros, a sum that some actors have put into perspective with the amounts redistributed to shareholders at the group level[17]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The group is gradually adapting to new environmental standards while conducting well-organized lobbying work in Brussels. According to the EU transparency registers, ArcelorMittal devoted a lobbying budget ranging from 1.25 to 1.5 million euros for the period from February 2025 to January 2026. It is also noted that the company held no fewer than 166 high-level meetings with the European Commission with a team of 5 full-time equivalent employees[18]<\/a>. <\/p>\n These actions were particularly decisive during several negotiations with European authorities.<\/p>\n The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is a market mechanism established by the European Union to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. It is based on the “cap and trade” principle[19]<\/a>: a global emissions cap is set for the sectors concerned (industry, power generation, aviation), and emission allowances are distributed to companies, either for free or through auctions. Each allowance corresponds to one tonne of CO\u2082. Companies must surrender a number of allowances equivalent to their actual emissions, but they can also buy or sell them according to their needs. This system thus incentivizes the most polluting actors to reduce their emissions. <\/p>\n However, the steel sector constitutes an exception. To prevent the risk of carbon leakage (relocation to jurisdictions with lower climate standards), the EU grants a significant portion of these allowances for free to the steel industry[20]<\/a>. <\/p>\n This allocation, however, has perverse effects through the mechanism of windfall profits[21]<\/strong><\/a><\/em>. Companies can certainly pass on the opportunity cost of carbon in their prices, even when they benefit from free allowances. Furthermore, during periods of economic slowdown, if production falls, the allowances allocated based on past years may prove too generous compared to actual emissions. In this case, they have the possibility to resell this surplus on the market. Some sources estimate that ArcelorMittal has historically been able to capture a predominant share of these over-allocation profits in the sector[22]<\/a>. <\/p>\n <\/strong>Influence on Technical Benchmarks<\/strong><\/p>\n The setting of these quotas relies on technical benchmarks. The fact that the industry has succeeded in keeping these rules almost unchanged can be explained by two main levers of influence. <\/p>\n First, through information asymmetry. To establish these benchmarks, the European Commission has long relied on data collected and voluntarily provided by industry associations, such as EUROFER[23]<\/a>. This gave the industry a decisive advantage in defining the starting standard. <\/p>\n Second, targeted action on the legislative process allowed for the acquisition of tailor-made exemptions. During the revisions of the directive, the steel sector, for example, negotiated an exceptionally low annual reduction rate of 0.2% for its specific benchmark (that of liquid iron), while other industries had to reduce by up to 1.6%[24]<\/a>. Furthermore, by maintaining an allocation by manufacturing process rather than by final product, lobbying avoided putting traditional, highly polluting blast furnaces in direct competition with electric recycling routes, which emit much less. The sector also locked the system by preventing any major revision of this benchmark between 2026 and 2030. Thus, the most polluting facilities continue to receive a quantity of these free allowances. <\/p>\n <\/strong>The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)<\/strong><\/p>\n The entry into force of the CBAM aims to apply carbon pricing to imports. In accordance with WTO rules, this customs mechanism must be accompanied by a gradual phase-out of internal free allowances by 2034[25]<\/a>. ArcelorMittal and EUROFER, initially in favor of the CBAM to limit imports[26]<\/a>, are now campaigning for regulatory adjustments, specifically requesting the maintenance of a form of free allocation or structural support to preserve the competitiveness of their exports in the face of this announced phase-out[27]<\/a>. <\/p>\n <\/strong>The Mirage of the Ecological Transition<\/strong><\/p>\n By prioritizing the continued operation of its most financially amortized facilities (such as the coal-fired blast furnace No. 4 in Dunkirk, whose lifespan was discreetly extended by a 165 million euro investment in 2025)[28]<\/a> at the expense of the accelerated development of Direct Reduced Iron (DRI) solutions, the group distorts the timeline of the Paris Agreement.<\/p>\n Future electric arc furnaces, often presented as the clean solution for steel, have a crucial need: they must be fed with large quantities of recycled scrap or pre-reduced ore (DRI) to produce quality steel. However, by renouncing the installation of DRI production units in Europe, ArcelorMittal gives itself the possibility of importing highly polluting iron produced outside the continent to run its furnaces in France. The group’s strict climate commitments for 2030\u2014a 35% reduction in emissions\u2014officially concern only its direct emissions and those related to the energy it consumes (Scopes 1 and 2). Consequently, the company could display an artificially cleaned carbon footprint in France while shifting the real environmental problem further down its supply chain (Scope 3). Ultimately, decarbonization financed by public money is transformed, through this accounting sleight of hand, into a vast operation of institutional greenwashing<\/em>. <\/p>\n An investigation by the media outlet Blast<\/em>[29]<\/a>, published on YouTube on April 16, 2026, reveals the behind-the-scenes of ArcelorMittal’s so-called “ecological” steel. Behind the promises of a transition to “green steel,” an entire polluting industrial chain persists, linking Mozambique’s coal mines to factories like the one in Dunkirk. The report shows the concrete consequences of this activity in Mozambique: displaced communities, land affected by pollution, and an economy still just as dependent on coal. A picture that contrasts sharply with the decarbonization discourse held in Europe. The investigation also questions the public subsidies granted to the steel giant, pointing to a troubling gap between green communication and the reality of practices. <\/p>\n In addition to challenging European legislation aimed at reducing greenhouse gases, the ArcelorMittal group has also carried out several revisions of its decarbonization projects in Europe, citing changes in energy costs and regulatory uncertainties:<\/p>\n In parallel, the group continues its investments in traditional production capacities in growing regions such as India and Brazil[34]<\/a>.<\/p>\n The example of ArcelorMittal poses a fundamental challenge for today’s industrial policies: how to manage the relationship between a finance-driven multinational and the rules set by States. This concrete case reveals the tensions over sovereignty that arise when a company seeks to optimize, or even circumvent, regulations in sectors that are nevertheless essential to the strategic independence of a country or a continent. <\/p>\n The intervention model is confronted with a very concrete reality: that of a group playing with the rules, practicing a form of aggressive optimization, or even “regulatory predation,” in the face of a public authority that no longer possesses means of pressure.<\/p>\n In France, the way in which public aid, investment halts, and job reductions follow one another has revived an old debate: how should the State intervene, and how can we preserve our industrial sovereignty? The example of Dunkirk is striking. After the promise of 850 million euros in aid and major work on the electrical grids, the industrial project was put on hold, followed by a social plan. This succession of events shows the extent to which the balance of power is skewed. <\/p>\n This imbalance has reawakened discussions in the National Assembly and the Senate. In late 2025 and early 2026, bills were studied to nationalize ArcelorMittal’s French activities. Those who defended this idea relied on figures: the cost of nationalization was estimated at approximately 1.4 billion euros[35]<\/a>, a sum close to the aid already granted. Although the proposal was ultimately rejected by the Senate in February 2026[36]<\/a>, the mere fact that it was debated reveals a growing distrust toward current incentive mechanisms and the vulnerability of public authorities to multinationals capable of playing with geography. <\/p>\n At the European level, the same issues are at work regarding the ArcelorMittal group’s ability to influence regulations related to the steel sector.<\/p>\n <\/strong><\/p>\n ArcelorMittal’s management of decarbonization confronts French and European public decision-makers with a fundamental question. The various examples in France, Germany, Spain, and Italy show the limits of an industrial policy that would settle for incentives without associating them with real constraints. <\/p>\n To regain regulatory and industrial sovereignty in the face of such optimization strategies, it appears necessary to review public support frameworks. A successful transition in the heavy metals sector therefore requires firmer conditionalities. In other words, State aid should be formally linked to binding commitments: strict adherence to technological investment schedules, guarantees on maintaining local jobs, and alignment of dividend distribution policies with the financing needs of the ecological transition. <\/a><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":18,"featured_media":6536,"template":"","champ-recherche":[36],"class_list":["post-6534","champ-de-recherche","type-champ-de-recherche","status-publish","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","champ-recherche-guerre-economique"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nPart 1. ArcelorMittal: Economic Intelligence as a Tool for Regulatory Optimization <\/strong><\/h2>\n
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Governance and Shareholding: A Globalized Decision-Making Structure<\/strong><\/h3>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
1.1. The 2006 Capital Evolution<\/strong><\/h4>\n
1.2. Concentrated Governance<\/strong><\/h4>\n
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Analysis of Regulatory Optimization and Investment Strategies<\/strong><\/h3>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
<\/strong>2.1. Negotiations and Public Co-financing: The French Example<\/strong><\/h4>\n
<\/strong>2.2. Capital Allocation Policy and Environmental Investments<\/strong><\/h4>\n
2.3. Interest Representation and Management of the European Carbon Market<\/strong><\/h4>\n
<\/strong>Optimization of the Emission Trading System (EU ETS)<\/strong><\/h5>\n
2.4. Revisions of Investment Strategies in Europe<\/strong><\/h4>\n
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What Sovereignty Challenges Face France and Europe Against ArcelorMittal’s Regulatory Capture?<\/strong><\/h3>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
<\/strong>3.1. The Limits of the Subsidy Model and the Debate on State Intervention<\/strong><\/h3>\n
3.2. Perspectives for Industrial Policy<\/strong><\/h3>\n