{"id":6376,"date":"2025-11-14T14:14:18","date_gmt":"2025-11-14T13:14:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/vietnam-between-bamboo-diplomacy-and-economic-warfare-from-defensive-to-offensive\/"},"modified":"2025-11-14T14:14:18","modified_gmt":"2025-11-14T13:14:18","slug":"vietnam-between-bamboo-diplomacy-and-economic-warfare-from-defensive-to-offensive","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/vietnam-between-bamboo-diplomacy-and-economic-warfare-from-defensive-to-offensive\/","title":{"rendered":"Vietnam: Between Bamboo Diplomacy and Economic Warfare\u2014From Defensive to Offensive?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Author’s Note:<\/strong><\/h3>\n

This article was written as part of the preparations for the symposium “Economic Warfare in Times of Peace<\/a>“[1]<\/a> organized at the Senate by CR451 in October 2024[2]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

For over a year, the public security system established in Vietnam for many years appears to be strengthening.<\/p>\n

Indeed, since General T\u00f4 L\u00e2m (August 2024), the former all-powerful Minister of Public Security, acceded to the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party, the 30 main positions of the Party and the State at both central and provincial levels are primarily occupied by generals from the ranks of Public Security and\/or the Army.<\/p>\n

Simultaneously, the country is embarking on a drastic administrative reform aimed at better societal control, allowing for a counter-intuitive form of “strictly regulated liberalization” of the country’s economic forces to face the next major challenge: avoiding being downgraded among ASEAN countries, which are partner nations but nonetheless competitors.<\/p>\n

This confirmation of the strengthening of the security apparatus in service of Vietnam’s economic development will be the subject of a forthcoming article to be published after the 14th<\/sup> Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, which will be held in Hanoi from January 19 to 25, 2025.<\/p>\n

Methodological Reminder:<\/strong><\/h3>\n

The approach to this subject, like most other subjects treated by the author, relies on the reading and arrangement of primary Vietnamese sources dealing with the topic and published by Vietnam’s official media.<\/p>\n

The analysis lies more in rendering the final text within the vision intended by the Vietnamese authorities rather than attempting to analyze it through our traditional analytical frameworks, as our representations are often quite distant from Vietnamese ones.<\/p>\n

This approach to the country through the “sensory” (language, culture, physical terrain) allowing one to “take their point of view” to understand their representations as closely as possible is the deliberate choice adopted by the author to operate a necessary “decentering” for a better understanding of the “source” of the phenomena studied.<\/p>\n

This approach aims to limit as much as possible the risk of “cognitive bias” that could be caused by “extra-sensory” representations forged by the target readership, who are often detached from the “physical” terrain.<\/p>\n

Introduction: <\/strong><\/h2>\n

Vietnam will soon celebrate the 40th anniversary of the deployment of its “Renovation” policy initiated in 1986, which aimed to end economic isolation and initiate an opening to new partners in the face of the predicted fall of the USSR.<\/p>\n

This “\u0110\u1ed5i m\u1edbi” policy, decided during the 6th<\/sup> Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, accelerated in the 1990s with rapid and progressive economic integration achieved through the signing of diplomatic, trade, and investment agreements with countries in the Asian zone and then the rest of the world. Originally benefiting from a cost advantage and abundant resources (human and natural), Vietnam has seen its GDP per capita rise from $200 in the early 1990s to approximately $4,400 in 2024 over forty years. <\/p>\n

Vietnam is currently one of the countries most open to the global economy[3]<\/a> and has long relied heavily on foreign investment to foster its economic growth. This phenomenon has intensified since the US-China trade war, where the American “de-risking” policy initially had the effect of increasing the transfer of production capacities established in China to Vietnam. <\/p>\n

Throughout this period of opening, Vietnam was able to implement an economic warfare policy[4]<\/a> by increasing economic power in the service of the country’s authorities and population[5]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

This notion of economic warfare was understood relatively early in Vietnam[6]<\/a>. Has it been theorized, however? <\/p>\n

Definitions provided by Vietnamese institutional sites provide the following insight:<\/p>\n

According to the Legal Library website[7]<\/a>: “Vietnamese law has not yet specifically defined the term ‘economic security.’ However, based on the actual situation, we can understand the term security in a fairly simple way. ‘Economic security’ consists of ensuring the stability, sound development, and vitality of the country’s economy. It is a fundamental element of national security, playing an important role in protecting national interests and ensuring the sustainable development of Vietnam.”<\/p>\n

According to the press organ of the People’s Security University (Ministry of Public Security)[8]<\/a>: “In Vietnam, economic security is an integral part of national security aimed at building a socialist-oriented market economy whose goal is to ensure the production and business development of all economic sectors. The protection of economic security includes activities related to the prevention, detection, and fight against economic sabotage plots and the acts of hostile forces as well as economic crimes that cause damage to the national economy.”<\/p>\n

It can therefore be observed that, as in China, this economic opening was accompanied from its inception by political, administrative, and cultural control organized through an economic security policy which, while not clearly enshrined in legal texts, was synonymous with Vietnam’s regulated economic development.<\/p>\n

In a context of increasingly marked competition between nations and the necessity for Vietnam to pursue its economic development, what are the main challenges this country faces to maintain an effective compromise between increasing power and economic security?<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. \n

    Vietnam’s opening: the foundation of national power increase<\/strong><\/h3>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    The promulgation of the “Renovation” policy in December 1986 allowed Vietnam to gradually open up to foreign investment (first Law on Foreign Investment[9]<\/a>), foreign trade (Asian zone then global), as well as technology transfers practiced by “industrialized” countries attracted by new markets and larger financial margins.<\/p>\n

    Thanks to this controlled opening policy, the economy has continued to develop. Between 1986-1990, the average annual GDP growth rate was 4.4%. Then during the period 1996-2000, this rate rose to 7%. For the period 2016-2019, it reached 6.8%. After a dip during the COVID period, this GDP growth rate returned to a level of 5.05% in 2023 and reached 7.09% in 2024. <\/p>\n

    Vietnamese GDP in 2023 amounted to approximately $430 billion, placing Vietnam in 5th<\/sup> or 6th<\/sup> place among ASEAN economies. GDP per capita rose from $200 in 1992 to $4,300 in 2023. Inflation was controlled at 3.25% in 2023. That same year, foreign trade reached $683 billion[10]<\/a> (Exports: $355.5 billion (-4.4%) – Imports: $327.5 billion (68.9%)). Vietnam is currently one of the most open countries to the global economy with some 17 Free Trade Agreements signed and two in the process of being signed. One of its strengths has been its cost advantage and especially its ability to play the relationship from the weak to the strong to satisfy the demands of consumer countries for low-cost and high-demand products such as textiles, footwear, basic agri-food products, and later telephony and electronic products. <\/p>\n

    Furthermore, the ability of Vietnamese authorities to maintain a certain equidistance between its multitude of partners (Bamboo Diplomacy) has allowed Vietnam to maximize the commercial opportunities presented to it.<\/p>\n

    This strong economic growth was possible thanks to the mobilization of all the country’s economic means to increase its power or the standard of living of its inhabitants. The levers for increasing Vietnam’s power were achieved through the following various vectors: <\/p>\n