{"id":6378,"date":"2026-09-07T16:30:22","date_gmt":"2026-09-07T14:30:22","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/"},"modified":"2026-09-07T16:30:22","modified_gmt":"2026-09-07T14:30:22","slug":"gaining-perspective-for-action","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/","title":{"rendered":"Gaining Perspective for Action"},"content":{"rendered":"<h2><strong>By General Jean-Claude Gallet and Christian Harbulot<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>Several recent crises have highlighted the difficulties faced by French elites in defining a power politics and the stance to adopt in confronting power dynamics. The blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has added a new dimension to the interactions between military and economic warfare. Faced with such challenges, France cannot afford to neglect a redefinition of its power politics and must demonstrate boldness. However, recurrent cultural obstacles currently prevent us from making such a strategic shift.   <\/p>\n<h2><strong>Domestic Political Stakes Supplant the Issue of Power<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>The contemporary history of France has been marked by three major crises: 1815, 1871, 1940. Despite contextual differences, these three crises share a common point: the victory of an enemy against our armies, which then supports a French political force that rises to power following the defeat. Let us recall the principle of this similarity:  <\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>1815: Restoration of royal power with the support of European monarchies and Tsarist Russia, who defeated Napoleon I&#8217;s French army at Waterloo.<\/li>\n<li>1871: Creation of a new political regime (Thiers in Versailles) with the support of Bismarck, who defeated the French army in 1870.<\/li>\n<li>1940: The Vichy regime and its policy of collaboration with Nazi Germany, which defeated the French army in June 1940.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>In all three cases, the question of power takes precedence over the question of national strength. Put differently, the political struggle for power is an end in itself, obstructing any clear reflection on the state of France&#8217;s power and coherent ways to remedy it. This political dynamic fuels division and turns its back on the national unity necessary to counter an external enemy. In 1815, royalists opposed Bonapartists and republicans. In 1870, the bourgeoisie and aristocracy sought the eviction of Napoleon III and then the armed repression of the Paris Commune. In 1940, the movement around Marshal P\u00e9tain worked for the disappearance of the Third Republic in favor of creating a new State. How can one imagine that the word &#8220;patriotism&#8221; still held meaning for the population in such a national imbroglio?      <\/p>\n<h2><strong>The Process of Rendering &#8220;Patriotic&#8221; Stakes Invisible <\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>An alliance with an enemy comes at a high price. Regarding the Restoration period, France would gradually have to abandon its economic defense system, developed since the revolutionary wars to counter Great Britain&#8217;s<a href=\"#_edn1\" name=\"_ednref1\">[1]<\/a> commercial power ambitions. The latter wanted to export its manufactured goods to France by dismantling the protectionist measures established during the Revolution and reinforced under the First Empire. French employers at the time advocated for maintaining customs barriers, which were all the more necessary given that the accumulated delay in the English industrial revolution exposed our own manufactures to highly unequal competition.   <\/p>\n<p>Positions against the harm of British mercantile imperialism had a limited lifespan. Napoleon III replaced them with an ode to industrial progress and the improvement of social conditions. Liberal ideas became the foundation of the universal framework for understanding the functioning of the market economy. In France, this mode of reasoning reduced the vision of power to the defense of borders and the supply of strategic resources. External military operations (Crimean War, Mexican War, the continued conquest of Algeria) remained out of sync with a patriotic imperative.    <\/p>\n<p>In 1870, the domestic political question once again outweighed the issue of power. The threat posed by Prussia served as a pretext to arbitrate divisions within the French imperial executive (authoritarian empire and liberal empire). Royalist forces from the Restoration period, highly influential within the military hierarchy, sought to drive a political solution, ready to engage in dialogue with Germany rather than allow France to unravel under the impetus of a social revolt.  <\/p>\n<p>From this seemingly inextricable situation emerged a compromise orchestrated by the former royalist Adolphe Thiers, who is presented as the &#8220;butcher of the Commune&#8221; and one of the initiators of the Republic&#8217;s re-establishment. It is worth recalling that one of the leaders of the French army, Marshal Bazaine<a href=\"#_edn2\" name=\"_ednref2\">[2]<\/a>, was tried for treason after the 1870 war. However, his trial largely contributed to &#8220;muddying the waters,&#8221; meaning it avoided addressing the fundamental issue.  <\/p>\n<p>Behind the defeat loomed the choice to prioritize resolving an internal political crisis rather than addressing a fundamental power issue: the balance of power with Prussia, a driving force behind the reconstitution of a newly conquering Germany.<\/p>\n<h2><strong>Was Colonization a Substitute for Power Politics?<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>The controversy that erupted in July 1885 between Georges Cl\u00e9menceau and Jules Ferry is one of the rare moments in French political life where two opposing viewpoints visibly clashed on the strategy to ensure France&#8217;s future in geopolitical, military, and economic terms. The consequences of the military defeat against Prussia raised the question of how to preserve France&#8217;s future in terms of power. Ferry<a href=\"#_edn3\" name=\"_ednref3\">[3]<\/a> advocated for the development of a colonial empire. Cl\u00e9menceau was against it<a href=\"#_edn4\" name=\"_ednref4\">[4]<\/a>.   <\/p>\n<p>But once again, the confusion was total. Ferry, a moderate republican, thus justified the civilizing dimension of colonization by emphasizing the duty of superior races to civilize inferior races. Cl\u00e9menceau, a radical republican, for his part, highlighted the limits of this type of argumentation. He recalled in this regard that German scholars claimed to have &#8220;scientifically&#8221; demonstrated that France had to be defeated in the Franco-German War because the French were of an inferior race to the Germans.   <\/p>\n<p>Ferry sought to build, through the colonial empire, a substitute for power that would allow France to continue to exist in the concert of nations, despite the consequences of the 1870 defeat. Cl\u00e9menceau advocated for a concentration of forces and resources to strengthen the industrial capacities of the metropolitan territory. While the debate was very heated in the Assembly, it did not lead to a clear vision of the strategic stakes.  <\/p>\n<p>Once again, the question of power monopolized attention at the expense of collective reflection on the country&#8217;s strategic orientations.<\/p>\n<p>This partly explains why the construction of the colonial empire occurred rather haphazardly. It is therefore not surprising that attempts to preserve French power interests after the collapse of the Napoleonic Empire<a href=\"#_edn5\" name=\"_ednref5\">[5]<\/a> were not remembered by the political world and high administration. <\/p>\n<p>Yet, there were lessons to be learned from this maneuvering capability of a weakened France, in a weak-to-strong relationship with the dominant British Empire and then the resurgent German Empire. This included diplomatic maneuvers leading to commercial dependency through debt (with Egypt in particular), but also international cultural operations (four World&#8217;s Fairs between 1859 and 1900) that fostered economic creativity (birth of the luxury industry). <\/p>\n<p>After the trauma of the 1870 war, controversy overshadowed what could have served as a basis for a clear-sighted approach to the problem of power. But the loss of a portion of metropolitan territory steered the debate towards an exacerbated vision of &#8220;nationalism.&#8221; <\/p>\n<h2><strong>The Vagaries in Determining the Major Threat <\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>The vigilance system established after the Treaty of Versailles overlooked the mental &#8220;rearmament&#8221; of a part of German youth from the beginning of the Weimar Republic. The Allied control commission, which crisscrossed Germany to verify that the new social-democratic government was indeed applying the military restriction clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, failed to grasp<a href=\"#_edn6\" name=\"_ednref6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a> what was happening in German civil society. For example, the preservation of the imperial army&#8217;s memory was entrusted to gymnastics societies and educational structures, as well as the safekeeping of the flags of the dissolved regiments of the Second Reich army.  <\/p>\n<p>This lack of vigilance was compounded by the little interest given to the content of <em>Mein Kampf, <\/em>Adolf Hitler&#8217;s emblematic work<a href=\"#_edn7\" name=\"_ednref7\">[7]<\/a>. The following excerpt illustrates the thinking of the future leader of Nazi Germany regarding France: <\/p>\n<blockquote><p>&#8220;France, an imperialist nation, is the inexorable and mortal enemy of the German people. [&#8230;] Our primary objective is to crush France. We must first gather all our energy against this people who hate us. In the annihilation of France, Germany sees the means to give our people on another stage all the expansion of which it is capable.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The formalization of a main threat by Hitler&#8217;s territorial conquest ambitions was distorted by the reversals of position of certain factions of the political class between the two wars.<\/p>\n<p>Conservative and nationalist circles<a href=\"#_edn8\" name=\"_ednref8\">[8]<\/a> shifted from a principled anti-Germanism until the late 1920s to denouncing a war with Germany until the Phoney War.<\/p>\n<p>For their part, left-wing forces moved from advocating pacifism to denouncing the danger of far-right dictatorships. This confusion of minds regarding the determination of the major threat was exacerbated by the particular case of the French Communist Party, which paused its denunciation of the Nazi danger due to the Molotov\u2013Ribbentrop Pact. <\/p>\n<p>Added to this lack of political unity on the vital question of France&#8217;s defense were the ambiguous relations forged by certain French industrial groups with German industrial groups until 1938.<\/p>\n<p>The absence of a unified vision on the main and priority threat, namely that the most menacing enemy was Hitler and not Stalin, led to France&#8217;s hesitations and inaction regarding the intimidation strategies that the Third Reich pursued against France and in Europe between 1933 and 1939.<\/p>\n<h2><strong>Let Us Not Make a Clean Sweep of the Past<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>Charles de Freycinet, a polytechnician and engineer from the \u00c9cole des Mines, was a French politician who initiated a policy of reconstructing French power during and after the defeat of the 1870 war. He had the particularity of having acquired a dual culture: that of the weak and then that of the strong. <\/p>\n<p><em> <\/em><\/p>\n<h3><em>Lessons Learned from the Culture of the Weak. <\/em><\/h3>\n<p>In October 1870, he joined Gambetta, who had just escaped from Paris by balloon to organize resistance from Tours, then Bordeaux. Appointed delegate of the Minister of War \u2014 in practice Gambetta&#8217;s closest technical and organizational collaborator \u2014 Freycinet took charge of the material reconstitution of the French military apparatus: raising and equipping the armies of National Defense, requisitioning and redeploying industry towards war production, coordinating logistics between dispersed administrations and a partially occupied territory. It was no longer just about winning battles, but about making a state function again from scratch, using the engineer&#8217;s methods: inventory of resources, organization of flows, administrative discipline.  <\/p>\n<p><em> <\/em><\/p>\n<h3><em>Lessons Learned from the Culture of the Strong.<\/em><\/h3>\n<p>Drawing on this experience, Freycinet<a href=\"#_edn9\" name=\"_ednref9\">[9]<\/a> acquired the conviction, which he would hold throughout his life, that the power of a modern state rests on its ability to mobilize and circulate \u2014 men, goods, information.<\/p>\n<p>Converting a public works program into effective economic power requires the ability to implement it over time, under multiple parliamentary majorities and despite governmental crises. Freycinet served as President of the Council four times, making him one of the most resilient heads of government of the Third Republic. <\/p>\n<p>Freycinet&#8217;s actions in favor of French economic power were not limited to public works. As Minister of War twice (1888-1893 and then 1898-1899), he commissioned the French industry to modernize armaments \u2014 particularly with the implementation of the 75mm cannon, which would play a crucial role during the First World War. <\/p>\n<p><strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n<h2><strong>Two French Case Studies of Power Reconstruction Through Economy<\/strong><\/h2>\n<p>We often have too short a memory. In this period of crisis where the French political class is seeking a strategic rebound, it may be necessary to recall two contemporary examples of the reconstruction of the French state through economic and technical power. These are a President of the Council from the beginning of the Third Republic and the creator of the Fifth Republic.  <\/p>\n<p>Charles de Freycinet, from 1870, and Charles de Gaulle, from 1958, occupy a structurally comparable position in the history of the French State: that of the man who must re-establish the authority of a regime born from a major crisis, and who chooses to do so primarily through the reconstruction of economic and technical power. Charles de Freycinet established a rail, river, and port network to develop the vital infrastructures of the national territory, whose industrial potential was amputated by the loss of part of Lorraine and Alsace after the defeat of 1871. After his return to power in 1958, General de Gaulle built a nuclear force, a space program, and a national IT industry to revive the French economy and assert France&#8217;s rank in a bipolar world.  <\/p>\n<p><em> <\/em><\/p>\n<h3><em>A Common Starting Point: The State&#8217;s Crisis of Legitimacy<\/em><\/h3>\n<p>Freycinet came to power following the collapse of the Second Empire and the military defeat of 1870-71: the army was severely weakened, the territory partially occupied, and the nascent republican regime still had to convince a rural France largely loyal to monarchist or Bonapartist notables.<\/p>\n<p>De Gaulle returned to power in May-June 1958 during a crisis of a different nature but of comparable gravity for the State: the Algerian War had precipitated the collapse of the Fourth Republic, the army was on the verge of insubordination, and the parliamentary regime was deemed incapable of governing.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3><em>A Highly Demonstrative Outcome<\/em><\/h3>\n<p>Freycinet and de Gaulle both responded to a collapse of state legitimacy with a grand economic and technical project led by a technocracy of engineers. This is the common core of their method in a context of geopolitical tensions and latent economic warfare. The former developed the architecture of rail, river, and maritime transport, necessary for the survival and growth of our country, which at the end of the 19th century faced the expansionist policies of empires. The latter gave France a new industrial and commercial impetus in a Cold War context between the two Blocs, while seeking to reduce our geo-economic dependence on our main ally, the United States of America. The analogy therefore lies less in the content of their respective achievements than in the scope of their political gesture: transforming a state crisis into an opportunity to rebuild it through the industrial and technical demonstration of its power.    <\/p>\n<p><strong>This article is the starting point for a series of video podcasts titled &#8220;Gaining Perspective for Action&#8221; which you can find on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/@CentreDeRecherche451)\">the CR451 YouTube channel<\/a> or on our website<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong> <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Notes<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref1\" name=\"_edn1\">[1]<\/a> David Todd, <em>France&#8217;s Economic Identity, Free Trade and Protectionism, 1814<\/em>&#8211;<em>1851<\/em>, Paris, Grasset, 2008.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref2\" name=\"_edn2\">[2]<\/a> In three episodes broadcast in 1962 on T\u00e9l\u00e9vision Suisse Romande, historian Henri Guillemin revisits the causes of the capitulation of French Marshal Fran\u00e7ois Achille Bazaine during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/playlist?list=PLKNG7_VcYTb6fq3RplIQnv3Ok1erLrSyo<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref3\" name=\"_edn3\">[3]<\/a> https:\/\/pedagogie.ac-nantes.fr\/medias\/fichier\/corpus-documents_1587803102811-pdf<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref4\" name=\"_edn4\">[4]<\/a> https:\/\/histoire-geo.ac-amiens.fr\/IMG\/pdf\/Evaluation_sommative_Lucile_DS_Georges_Clemenceau.pdf<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref5\" name=\"_edn5\">[5]<\/a> David Todd, <em>An Empire of Velvet, French Informal Imperialism in the 19th Century, <\/em>Paris, La d\u00e9couverte, 2022.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref6\" name=\"_edn6\">[6]<\/a> Jacques Benoist M\u00e9chin, <em>History of the German Army<\/em>, Volume 1, Paris, Robert Laffont editions, Bouquins collection, 1984.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref7\" name=\"_edn7\">[7]<\/a> In 1936, Adolf Hitler won the lawsuit he brought in France against Nouvelles \u00c9ditions latines to ban the distribution of his work.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref8\" name=\"_edn8\">[8]<\/a> March 15, 1936: Maurras publishes in Action Fran\u00e7aise &#8220;No Jewish crusade because fighting with Germany means fighting for the benefit of the Jews&#8221; while a few years earlier, the same Charles Maurras supported the necessity of publishing &#8220;Mein Kampf&#8221; in French to revive anti-Germanism.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref9\" name=\"_edn9\">[9]<\/a> C\u00e9dric Lewandowski, <em>Charles de Freycinet, Strategist of the Republic<\/em>, Paris, Pass\u00e9s compos\u00e9s edition, 2026.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By General Jean-Claude Gallet and Christian Harbulot Several recent crises have highlighted the difficulties faced by French elites in defining a power politics and the stance to adopt in confronting power dynamics. The blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has added a new dimension to the interactions between military and economic warfare. Faced with such [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":6379,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_et_pb_use_builder":"","_et_pb_old_content":"","_et_gb_content_width":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[129,131,130],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-6378","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles","category-cr451-takes-a-stand","category-featured","et-has-post-format-content","et_post_format-et-post-format-standard"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.4 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Gaining Perspective for Action - CR451<\/title>\n<meta name=\"description\" content=\"Wooden steps staircase and dotted path leading to a hit target, viewed through a magnifying glass\" \/>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Gaining Perspective for Action - 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Auteur du chapitre Le terrorisme et le terrain \u00e9conomique, dans les actes du colloque \u00ab L\u2019Etat et le terrorisme \u00bb, sous la direction de Pierre Bourdon et Fran\u00e7ois Blanc, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2018. Auteur de la section L\u2019analyse compar\u00e9e du management de l\u2019information dans l\u2019ouvrage coordonn\u00e9 par Alice Guilhon et Nicolas Moinet, Intelligence \u00e9conomique, s\u2019informer, se prot\u00e9ger, influencer, Paris, Pearson, 2016. Les fabricants d\u2019intox, la guerre mondialis\u00e9e des propagandes, Lemieux \u00e9diteur, mars 2016. Coordinateur de la version 2 du Manuel d\u2019intelligence \u00e9conomique, comprendre la guerre \u00e9conomique, PUF, 2015. Rapport d\u2019alerte La France est-elle capable de contrer Daech sur le terrain de la guerre de l\u2019information ? \u00e9dit\u00e9 par Ecole de Guerre Economique, mai 2015. Sabordage, comment la France d\u00e9truit sa puissance, \u00e9dition Fran\u00e7ois Bourin, 2014. Auteur du chapitre La diplomatie d\u2019entreprise, instrument de puissance, dans l\u2019ouvrage Les diplomates d\u2019entreprise, Pouvoirs, r\u00e9seaux et influences, \u00e9ditions Choiseul, 2012. Coordinateur du Manuel d\u2019intelligence \u00e9conomique, PUF, 2012. Techniques offensives et guerre \u00e9conomique, r\u00e9\u00e9dition, Paris, \u00e9ditions de La Bourdonnaye, 2012. Co-auteur avec Eric Delbecque de l\u2019ouvrage La guerre \u00e9conomique, Que sais-je, PUF, 2010. Co-directeur de l\u2019ouvrage collectif Les chemins de la puissance, \u00e9ditions Tatamis, f\u00e9vrier 2007. La main invisible des puissances, nouvelle \u00e9dition, Ellipses, 2007. Co-auteur de La France a-t-elle une strat\u00e9gie de puissance \u00e9conomique ? Lavauzelle, mars 2004. Co-auteur de La guerre cognitive, ouvrage collectif de l\u2019Ecole de guerre \u00e9conomique, Lavauzelle, f\u00e9vrier 2002. Participation \u00e0 l\u2019ouvrage collectif Le chiffre, le renseignement et la guerre, article Guerre de l\u2019information ou la n\u00e9gation du chiffre, L\u2019Harmattan, 2002. Co-auteur avec le G\u00e9n\u00e9ral (cr) Pichot-Duclos, de l\u2019ouvrage La France doit dire non, Plon, mars 1999. Co-auteur du rapport du Commissariat g\u00e9n\u00e9ral du Plan, Intelligence \u00e9conomique et strat\u00e9gie des entreprises, La documentation fran\u00e7aise, 1994. La machine de guerre \u00e9conomique, Economica, octobre 1992.\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/cr451.fr\\\/en\\\/author\\\/charbulot\\\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Gaining Perspective for Action - CR451","description":"Wooden steps staircase and dotted path leading to a hit target, viewed through a magnifying glass","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Gaining Perspective for Action - CR451","og_description":"Wooden steps staircase and dotted path leading to a hit target, viewed through a magnifying glass","og_url":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/","og_site_name":"CR451","article_published_time":"2026-09-07T14:30:22+00:00","og_image":[{"width":441,"height":226,"url":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/rebonds-cible.png","type":"image\/png"}],"author":"Christian Harbulot","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Christian Harbulot","Est. reading time":"12 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/"},"author":{"name":"Christian Harbulot","@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/bd2fa248a7e76eb5a8cd6deb2fb945e2"},"headline":"Gaining Perspective for Action","datePublished":"2026-09-07T14:30:22+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/"},"wordCount":2487,"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/rebonds-cible.png","articleSection":["Articles","CR451 takes a stand","Featured"],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/","url":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/","name":"Gaining Perspective for Action - CR451","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/#primaryimage"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/#primaryimage"},"thumbnailUrl":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/rebonds-cible.png","datePublished":"2026-09-07T14:30:22+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/bd2fa248a7e76eb5a8cd6deb2fb945e2"},"description":"Wooden steps staircase and dotted path leading to a hit target, viewed through a magnifying glass","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/"]}]},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/rebonds-cible.png","contentUrl":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/rebonds-cible.png","width":441,"height":226,"caption":"Ascending in successive stages leads to the objective, provided each step is measured and evaluated."},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/gaining-perspective-for-action\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Accueil","item":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/home\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Gaining Perspective for Action"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/#website","url":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/","name":"CR451","description":"Centre de recherche 451","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/#\/schema\/person\/bd2fa248a7e76eb5a8cd6deb2fb945e2","name":"Christian Harbulot","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/731f27bc9b5bd77cb55af2906340b9e30644cb910fde352b0195c52f41b39b04?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/731f27bc9b5bd77cb55af2906340b9e30644cb910fde352b0195c52f41b39b04?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/731f27bc9b5bd77cb55af2906340b9e30644cb910fde352b0195c52f41b39b04?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Christian Harbulot"},"description":"Ouvrages : L\u2019art de la guerre \u00e9conomique, Paris, VA \u00e9ditions, 2018. Auteur du chapitre Le terrorisme et le terrain \u00e9conomique, dans les actes du colloque \u00ab L\u2019Etat et le terrorisme \u00bb, sous la direction de Pierre Bourdon et Fran\u00e7ois Blanc, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 2018. Auteur de la section L\u2019analyse compar\u00e9e du management de l\u2019information dans l\u2019ouvrage coordonn\u00e9 par Alice Guilhon et Nicolas Moinet, Intelligence \u00e9conomique, s\u2019informer, se prot\u00e9ger, influencer, Paris, Pearson, 2016. Les fabricants d\u2019intox, la guerre mondialis\u00e9e des propagandes, Lemieux \u00e9diteur, mars 2016. Coordinateur de la version 2 du Manuel d\u2019intelligence \u00e9conomique, comprendre la guerre \u00e9conomique, PUF, 2015. Rapport d\u2019alerte La France est-elle capable de contrer Daech sur le terrain de la guerre de l\u2019information ? \u00e9dit\u00e9 par Ecole de Guerre Economique, mai 2015. Sabordage, comment la France d\u00e9truit sa puissance, \u00e9dition Fran\u00e7ois Bourin, 2014. Auteur du chapitre La diplomatie d\u2019entreprise, instrument de puissance, dans l\u2019ouvrage Les diplomates d\u2019entreprise, Pouvoirs, r\u00e9seaux et influences, \u00e9ditions Choiseul, 2012. Coordinateur du Manuel d\u2019intelligence \u00e9conomique, PUF, 2012. Techniques offensives et guerre \u00e9conomique, r\u00e9\u00e9dition, Paris, \u00e9ditions de La Bourdonnaye, 2012. Co-auteur avec Eric Delbecque de l\u2019ouvrage La guerre \u00e9conomique, Que sais-je, PUF, 2010. Co-directeur de l\u2019ouvrage collectif Les chemins de la puissance, \u00e9ditions Tatamis, f\u00e9vrier 2007. La main invisible des puissances, nouvelle \u00e9dition, Ellipses, 2007. Co-auteur de La France a-t-elle une strat\u00e9gie de puissance \u00e9conomique ? Lavauzelle, mars 2004. Co-auteur de La guerre cognitive, ouvrage collectif de l\u2019Ecole de guerre \u00e9conomique, Lavauzelle, f\u00e9vrier 2002. Participation \u00e0 l\u2019ouvrage collectif Le chiffre, le renseignement et la guerre, article Guerre de l\u2019information ou la n\u00e9gation du chiffre, L\u2019Harmattan, 2002. Co-auteur avec le G\u00e9n\u00e9ral (cr) Pichot-Duclos, de l\u2019ouvrage La France doit dire non, Plon, mars 1999. Co-auteur du rapport du Commissariat g\u00e9n\u00e9ral du Plan, Intelligence \u00e9conomique et strat\u00e9gie des entreprises, La documentation fran\u00e7aise, 1994. La machine de guerre \u00e9conomique, Economica, octobre 1992.","url":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/author\/charbulot\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6378","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6378"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6378\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/6379"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6378"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6378"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6378"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}