{"id":6392,"date":"2026-07-20T14:46:01","date_gmt":"2026-07-20T12:46:01","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/claude-a-case-of-information-warfare-through-the-container\/"},"modified":"2026-07-20T14:46:01","modified_gmt":"2026-07-20T12:46:01","slug":"claude-a-case-of-information-warfare-through-the-container","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/cr451.fr\/en\/claude-a-case-of-information-warfare-through-the-container\/","title":{"rendered":"Claude: A Case of Information Warfare Through the Container"},"content":{"rendered":"

On June 12, 2026, the U.S. Department of Commerce directs the American company Anthropic to suspend access to its Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5 artificial intelligence models for all foreign nationals[1]<\/a>. On June 26, 2026, it authorizes Anthropic to redeploy Mythos 5 to over one hundred trusted U.S. companies and institutions, several of which operate or protect critical infrastructure[2]<\/sup><\/a>. The same day, OpenAI opens a limited preview of GPT-5.6 Sol, which it presents as its most powerful model, to a small group of trusted partners whose participation has been communicated to the U.S. government[3]<\/a>. On June 30, the Department of Commerce lifts export controls on both models. Fable 5 is restored globally on July 1, with new protections in place[4]<\/a>. Mythos 5 remains, at this stage, reserved for authorized organizations under Project Glasswing. <\/p>\n

The Anthropic case, and to a lesser extent that of OpenAI, shows that the U.S. government intervenes directly in the conditions of access to some of the most advanced artificial intelligence models. It reveals a logic of information warfare through the container. This control is usually exercised over the media, infrastructure, or channels that allow information to circulate. Here, it applies to a tool that produces and processes information. This American approach is part of a broader strategy of technological and military power, in which mastery of artificial intelligence has become an issue of confrontation, particularly with China. <\/p>\n

A Suspension Based on Export Control<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In its statement of June 12, Anthropic announces that it has received an export control directive from the U.S. government, issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the Department of Commerce, which requires the immediate suspension of access to its Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5 models. The measure applies to all foreign nationals, whether they are in the United States or abroad, including non-U.S. employees of Anthropic. Initially, the company disables both models for all its customers. Other versions of Claude are not affected[5]<\/a>. <\/p>\n

This general deactivation is explained by a technical constraint. Anthropic has no means of establishing the nationality of its users in real time. Unable to distinguish foreign nationals without risking federal sanctions in case of error, the company shut down access for everyone, including U.S. users. A measure targeting foreign nationals thus deprived American actors of their own tools[6]<\/a>. <\/p>\n

Fable 5[7]<\/a> and Mythos 5[8]<\/a>, presented on June 9, 2026[9]<\/a>, use the same model. Their difference lies in the protections applied. According to the specialized press, Fable 5, intended for general use, redirects certain sensitive queries to Claude Opus 4.8, which is less powerful. For Mythos 5, these protections are lifted in certain domains and its access remains reserved for authorized organizations under the Project Glasswing program[10]<\/a>. To justify the directive, the U.S. government invokes national security. According to Anthropic, the U.S. government based its decision on the existence of a method to bypass certain protections of Fable 5, identified by Amazon researchers and transmitted to the authorities. The company, however, disputes the scope of this discovery insofar as the technique reportedly identified only a few minor flaws already known, which other models available on the market would also be capable of detecting[11]<\/a>. This alert comes from a private actor, itself the main investor in Anthropic, provider of its cloud infrastructure and contractor to the U.S. Department of Defense[12]<\/a>. <\/p>\n

Information Warfare Through the Container<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Christian Harbulot distinguishes information warfare through content, which acts on information and knowledge, from information warfare through the container, which applies to the systems and networks by which information is produced, transported, or made accessible[13]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

From this distinction, the CR451 webinar on the fundamental principles of information warfare identifies five modes of action of this warfare through the container[14]<\/a>: control of the media that enable production, transmission, or reception; control of the physical infrastructure that transports flows; control of access to content, platforms, and services; control of the funding necessary for the existence of an information actor; control of visibility.<\/p>\n

These categories can overlap, particularly in the digital realm, where a platform can be simultaneously a medium, a host, and a controller of visibility. Their distinction nevertheless makes it possible to identify the primary means of action. <\/p>\n

In the case of Claude, the primary means of action is access control and export control constitutes its legal instrument. The directive does not modify the operation of the models or the nature of the responses they can produce. It determines who can use them based on their nationality. <\/p>\n

A New Object of Access Control<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In its classic forms, access control targets content already produced or the channel that allows it to be consulted. Here, the restriction applies to generative artificial intelligence models, whose analyses, syntheses, or code do not exist before the user’s request. The directive therefore does not block access to existing information. It reduces the information capabilities of actors who were using Fable 5 and Mythos 5. The mode of action remains access control, now applied to an object of a different nature. <\/p>\n

Control of Artificial Intelligence Models in American Power Strategy<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The Claude case unfolds across several fields simultaneously. The decision of June 12, 2026 falls under export control on the legal level, national security on the political level, and mastery of a strategic technology on the economic level. On the information level, it restricts access to a tool for producing and processing information. <\/p>\n

Several texts published by the White House explicitly inscribe American policy on artificial intelligence in this strategy of technological power. The Executive Order<\/em> of July 23, 2025 creates a federal program intended to support the export of the entire American technological chain of artificial intelligence, from computer equipment and cloud services to models and applications. It aims to promote international adoption of American technologies and reduce dependence on technologies developed by adversaries of the United States[15]<\/sup><\/a>. <\/p>\n

The Executive Order <\/em>of June 2, 2026 provides for the creation of a voluntary framework for cooperation between developers of advanced models and the federal government. Developers who choose to participate can give authorities early access to their models and collaborate with them in selecting the partners who will benefit from them first[16]<\/sup><\/a>. <\/p>\n

On June 26, OpenAI’s announcement provides a first illustration of this cooperation. At the request of the U.S. government, the company initially reserves access to GPT-5.6 Sol to a small group of trusted partners, whose participation has been communicated to the authorities. Wider distribution is planned in the following weeks. Unlike the directive imposed on Anthropic, this restricted launch results from voluntary cooperation between OpenAI and the federal government[17]<\/a>. <\/p>\n

The directive also intervenes in a conflict already underway between Anthropic and the U.S. government concerning the conditions of military use of its models. The company supported certain national security uses, but wished to maintain restrictions concerning fully autonomous weapons and mass domestic surveillance[18]<\/a>. On February 27, 2026, President Trump orders federal agencies to cease using Anthropic’s models. The Department of Defense announces the same day that it will designate the company as a “supply chain risk.” Anthropic receives confirmation of this designation on March 4[19]<\/a>. <\/p>\n

On March 9, 2026, Anthropic initiates two federal proceedings to challenge this designation. The first is a civil action filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The second is a petition for review addressed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The company argues in particular that the measure sanctions the positions it has expressed on military uses of its models and that it violates its constitutional rights as well as the procedures provided by law[20]<\/a>. <\/p>\n

Finally, Anthropic had itself presented the capabilities of Mythos as too risky for wide distribution and equipped Fable 5 with protections intended to limit certain uses. Its discourse could thus have provided the government with an additional argument to justify the restriction[21]<\/a>. <\/p>\n

The objectives stated by the White House, the nationality criterion, the succession of measures taken against Anthropic, and the cooperation with OpenAI suggest that control of access to artificial intelligence models has become an instrument of American power. The national interests of the United States can thus lead to restricting the access of their allies to certain technologies. <\/p>\n

The Blowback Effects of the Directive<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In addition to the total deactivation of both models, including for U.S. users, several blowback effects can be identified.<\/p>\n

The first effect relates to market capture. By demonstrating that access to an American model could be suspended by an administrative decision, the directive strengthened interest in alternative solutions, particularly Chinese open-weight models such as DeepSeek, Qwen, or GLM. These models reduce the risk of cutoff by a single provider. Indeed, once downloaded, they can be run locally, without permanently depending on a remote service that could be suspended[22]<\/a>. <\/p>\n

During the suspension, Asian startups launched models presented as equivalent to Mythos and solicited customers deprived of access. The interruption of the American offering opened a space that they rushed to occupy. Dependence on a single provider, which constituted a lever of power for the United States, then becomes a risk that users seek to reduce. These reactions illustrate a constant of information warfare through the container, where each form of control creates its own circumvention strategies[23]<\/a>. <\/p>\n

The second effect, which follows from the first, is a risk of loss of influence for the United States in the field of artificial intelligence, even though the Executive Order<\/em> of July 23, 2025 aims to make the diffusion of American technologies a vector of influence[24]<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The directive could have produced another effect of a legal nature. On June 23, the American company Legion LegalTech, whose Canadian developers lost access to Fable 5, petitions federal court to challenge the directive. It describes the harm as “immediate, irreparable, and existential.” It argues that no text relating to export control covers hosted models or the content they produce, and that the directive contradicts the decree of June 2, 2026, which excludes the creation of a mandatory prior authorization regime for the distribution of new models. The judge could have ruled on the basis and scope of the directive and delimited its reach for future cases. On July 6, however, Legion ends the proceeding, access to the models having been restored. Without a proceeding, no judge will examine the legality of the directive. The government will therefore never have had to justify its action before a court[25]<\/a>. <\/p>\n

From Dependence to European Vulnerability<\/strong><\/h2>\n

For European organizations that use proprietary American models, the directive of June 12, 2026 shows that commercial dependence can become operational vulnerability. This situation is part of a broader context. A European Parliament study published in 2025 thus notes that Europe remains heavily dependent on non-European suppliers, mainly American, for software and cloud services, which creates strategic vulnerabilities[26]<\/a>. <\/p>\n

Many organizations access artificial intelligence models through application programming interfaces, integrate them into their internal procedures, and develop tools or document bases around them. This dependence becomes a vulnerability as soon as access can be interrupted by an external decision and no replacement solution has been planned. <\/p>\n

Dependence does not only concern continuity of access. Data transmitted to an American model also raises an issue of control and protection, insofar as it is entrusted to an actor subject to U.S. law. <\/p>\n

A case in the semiconductor industry illustrates this risk. In May 2025, the United States imposes new restrictions on the supply to China of electronic design software. Several suppliers then suspend sales, services, and access before the restrictions are lifted in early July[27]<\/a>. An American administrative measure can therefore interrupt overnight access to strategic software already integrated into its users’ activities. The comparison with Fable 5 has its limits, however, insofar as this software fulfills a specialized industrial function whereas Fable 5 is a general-purpose tool, used for research as well as for analysis or programming. <\/p>\n

The restoration of access does not eliminate this vulnerability. Mythos 5 was initially redeployed on June 26 to about one hundred trusted American organizations[28]<\/sup><\/a>, then export controls were lifted on June 30 and Fable 5 restored globally on July 1. The U.S. government will thus have demonstrated that it could suspend a commercial model already deployed globally, keep it offline from June 12 to July 1, then condition its return on the adoption of new protections and cooperation commitments. Mythos 5 remains, at this stage, reserved for partners in the Glasswing program. A precedent is thus established. <\/p>\n

<\/strong>An Extension of Information Warfare Through the Container <\/strong><\/h2>\n

With the Claude case, access control now targets generative artificial intelligence tools, that is, instruments that directly enhance the information capabilities of their users. If the object of control changes in nature, the mode of action still consists of acting on the container. <\/p>\n

For France and Europe, this precedent represents a warning. Access to technologies integrated into the activities of companies, administrations, or research organizations can be interrupted by a decision made in the United States, even when users are established in allied countries. The subsequent lifting of restrictions does not eliminate this vulnerability. It confirms that access to some of the most advanced American models can depend on an American sovereign decision, whether to suspend or restore access. <\/p>\n

This situation reveals an asymmetry between the United States, which sets the conditions of access to these technologies, and foreign actors, who can be deprived of them without participating in the decision.<\/p>\n

France and Europe must therefore anticipate new restrictions and prepare for them. This preparation requires knowing which uses would be affected by a new restriction and having fallback solutions, which excludes any exclusive dependence on a single provider. It requires, in the long term, a credible European offering of artificial intelligence models. The objective is to prevent a foreign decision from immediately depriving European actors of tools on which some of their activities depend. <\/p>\n

\"timeline<\/strong><\/p>\n

Notes<\/strong><\/h2>\n

[1]<\/a>Anthropic, “Statement on the US government directive to suspend access to Fable 5 and Mythos 5,” June 12, 2026<\/a>. The full text of the directive has not been made public. <\/p>\n

Reuters, “Anthropic disables top-tier AI models after US order limiting foreign access,” June 13, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Reuters, “US allows Anthropic to release Mythos AI to ‘trusted’ US organizations,” June 27, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Reuters, “OpenAI limits rollout of advanced GPT-5.6 models at US government request,” June 26, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Anthropic, “Redeploying Claude Fable 5,” July 1, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Ibid., note 1<\/a><\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Nextgov, “Anthropic suspends top AI models after U.S. export control order,” June 12, 2026<\/a>;<\/p>\n

IA et Strat\u00e9gie | Le SamourAI, “Le gouvernement am\u00e9ricain interdit Claude : ce que vous devez savoir,” June 13, 2026<\/a>; as well as the Anthropic statement cited in note 1<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Rotek, “Claude Fable 5 : Anthropic ouvre son mod\u00e8le le plus puissant au public,” June 10, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> Rotek, “Claude Mythos : le mod\u00e8le qu’Anthropic refuse d’ouvrir au public,” June 10, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[9]<\/a>Anthropic, “Claude Fable 5 and Mythos 5,” June 9, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[10]<\/a>Anthropic, “Project Glasswing,” April 7, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

“Project Glasswing is a cyberdefense initiative that puts the Claude Mythos Preview<\/a> model in the hands of organizations responsible for critical infrastructure. Partners use it to scan their code and fix vulnerabilities, while Anthropic shares the lessons learned with the entire sector.” in Rotek, “Project Glasswing : Anthropic met son IA la plus puissante au service de la cyberd\u00e9fense,” June 10, 2026<\/a> <\/p>\n

[11]<\/a>According to Anthropic, the authorities were reportedly informed of the existence of a jailbreaking method targeting Fable 5. Anthropic indicates that it examined a demonstration involving a small number of minor and already known vulnerabilities, and considers that other public models, including OpenAI’s GPT-5.5, allow comparable results to be obtained. Ibid., note 1. <\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Fortune, “How a warning from Amazon led the White House to shut down Anthropic’s Mythos model,” June 14, 2026<\/a>;<\/p>\n

Anthropic, “Redeploying Claude Fable 5,” July 1, 2026<\/a>;<\/p>\n

TechCrunch, “Pentagon inks deals with Nvidia, Microsoft and AWS to deploy AI on classified networks,” May 1, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[13]<\/a>Christian Harbulot, “La guerre de l’information,” CR451, January 24, 2023<\/a><\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> CR-451, webinar “Les 10 principes fondamentaux de la guerre de l’information,” May 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[15]<\/a>The White House, “Promoting the Export of the American AI Technology Stack,” Executive Order, July 23, 2025<\/a><\/p>\n

[16]<\/sup><\/a>The White House, “Promoting Advanced Artificial Intelligence Innovation and Security,” Executive Order, June 2, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> OpenAI, “Previewing GPT-5.6 Sol: a next-generation model,” June 26, 2026<\/a>;<\/p>\n

Reuters, “OpenAI limits rollout of advanced GPT-5.6 models at US government request,” June 26, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> Anthropic, “Statement from Dario Amodei on our discussions with the Department of War,” February 26, 2026<\/a>;<\/p>\n

Anthropic, “Statement on the comments from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth,” February 27, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[19]<\/a>Reuters, “Trump directs US agencies to toss Anthropic’s AI as Pentagon calls startup a supply risk,” February 27, 2026<\/a>;<\/p>\n

Anthropic, “Statement on the comments from Secretary of War Pete Hegseth,” February 27, 2026<\/a>;<\/p>\n

Anthropic, “Where things stand with the Department of War,” March 5, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[20]<\/a> Reuters, “Anthropic sues to block Pentagon blacklisting over AI use restrictions,” March 9, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[21]<\/a>Peter Girnus, cybersecurity researcher, on X, June 12, 2026<\/a>. Cited in Fortune, “Anthropic disables Fable and Mythos AI models,” June 13, 2026<\/a> <\/p>\n

[22]<\/a> Tech Startups, “Anthropic CEO warned that open-source AI could become ‘very dangerous’ as Western companies quietly switch to Chinese AI models,” June 29, 2026<\/a>;<\/p>\n

CNBC, “China’s Zhipu is closing in on top U.S. AI models with Anthropic and OpenAI held back,” June 26, 2026<\/a>;<\/p>\n

IA et Strat\u00e9gie | Le SamourAI, “le pi\u00e8ge du harnais et la fuite vers la Chine,” June 30, 2026.<\/a><\/p>\n

[23]<\/a> TechCrunch, “Asian AI startups launch Mythos-like models as Anthropic’s export ban drags on,” June 27, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[24]<\/a> Al Jazeera, “US export ban on Anthropic’s AI models further strains alliances,” June 19, 2026<\/a>.<\/p>\n

[25]<\/a> MLex, “Anthropic customer Legion LegalTech sues US to undo Fable 5, Mythos 5 ban,” June 23, 2026<\/a>;<\/p>\n

ZoneBourse, “Une soci\u00e9t\u00e9 de legal tech poursuit les \u00c9tats-Unis apr\u00e8s une d\u00e9cision limitant l’acc\u00e8s \u00e0 l’\u00e9tranger aux mod\u00e8les haut de gamme d’Anthropic,” June 23, 2026<\/a>;<\/p>\n

Reuters, “Legal tech firm ends lawsuit after US restores access to Anthropic models,” July 6, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n

[26]<\/a> European Parliament, “European Software and Cyber Dependencies,” study requested by the ITRE committee, December 2025<\/a><\/p>\n

[27]<\/a> Siemens Digital Industries Software, Tony Hemmelgarn, “A Statement from Tony Hemmelgarn,” June 4, 2025<\/a>;<\/p>\n

EETimes, “US restricts EDA software sales to China,” May 30, 2025<\/a>;<\/p>\n

Numerama,<\/strong> “Les \u00c9tats-Unis craignent un usage militaire des puces am\u00e9ricaines en Chine,” May 30, 2025<\/a>;<\/p>\n

Siemens Digital Industries Software, Tony Hemmelgarn, “A Statement from Tony Hemmelgarn,” July 3, 2025<\/a>;<\/p>\n

Reuters, “As trade war truce with China holds, US lifts curbs for chip design software,” July 3, 2025<\/a>;<\/p>\n

L’Usine Nouvelle, <\/strong>“Tr\u00eave dans la guerre des semi-conducteurs, les restrictions d’exportation des logiciels pour puces vers la Chine sont lev\u00e9es,” July 3, 2025<\/a><\/p>\n

[28]<\/a> Semafor, “US releases powerful Anthropic model Mythos to some US companies,” June 26, 2026<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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