By Arnaud de Morgny and Nicolas Moinet

On October 26, 2024, CR451 organized the 1st International Colloquium on Peacetime Economic Warfare.

This summary, written by Nicolas Moinet and Arnaud de Morgny, was initially published in the International Review of Economic Intelligence – R2IE.

Keywords in French: Guerre économique, Économie de guerre, Rapports de force, Monde matériel, Monde immatériel, Sécurité économique, Compétition, Contestation, Affrontement, Temps de guerre, Temps de paix, Martialisation

Keywords in English: Economic warfare, War economy, Power relations, Material world, Immaterial world, Economic security, Competition, Contestation, Confrontation, Wartime, Peacetime, Weaponization

Summary:

The first international colloquium on peacetime economic warfare, held on October 26, delved into the distinction between war economy, wartime economic warfare, and peacetime economic warfare. Speakers highlighted the underestimated importance of economic power relations in contemporary economic security strategies. The weaponization of economic interdependence was widely discussed as a symptom of increased global competition. Debates also focused on the need to develop more proactive economic intelligence mechanisms to counter the threats of financial and technological predation. Specific examples illustrated how economic competition could become a tool for increasing national power. The role of European institutions, as unwitting incubators of internal economic conflicts, was criticized for their lack of a clear strategic vision. The concept of systemic economic warfare was introduced to better identify hidden economic attacks disguised as cultural or environmental influence. Finally, speakers advocated for a shift away from traditional defensive approaches towards a clear offensive strategy in the face of new global economic threats.

Summary:

The first international colloquium on economic warfare during peacetime, held on 26 October, explored the distinction between the economy of war, wartime economic warfare and peacetime economic warfare. The speakers highlighted the underestimated importance of economic power relations in contemporary economic security strategies. The weaponization of economic interdependence was widely discussed as a symptom of increased global competition. Discussions also focused on the need to develop more proactive economic intelligence mechanisms to counter the threats of financial and technological predation. Specific examples illustrated how economic competition could become a tool for increasing national power. The role of European institutions as unwitting incubators of internal economic conflict was criticised for their lack of a clear strategic vision. The concept of systemic economic warfare was introduced to better identify hidden economic attacks under the guise of cultural or environmental influence. Finally, the speakers called for a move away from traditional defensive approaches towards a clear offensive strategy in the face of new global economic threats.

Colloquium Report

“Peacetime Economic Warfare”

On October 26, the first international colloquium on peacetime economic warfare was held. This colloquium was jointly organized by Ms. Gisèle Jourda, Senator for Aude, and the CR451, the applied research center of the School of Economic Warfare. During this day, more than 200 participants attended the proceedings in the Clémenceau room within the Palais du Luxembourg.

Ms. Gisèle Jourda and Mr. Christian Harbulot introduce the day.

Gisèle Jourda is Senator for Aude, Vice-President of the European Affairs Committee, Member of the Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces Committee, and Member of the Parliamentary Intelligence Delegation.

In her introduction, Ms. Jourda emphasized the importance and complexity of issues related to foreign interference. She noted that despite increased awareness of geopolitical and military dimensions, economic aspects remain underestimated in public and political debates. She advocated for a better assessment of risks associated with strategic foreign investments.

She deplored the absence of a genuine economic security policy, noting the inadequacy of the current legal framework in the face of a persistent and growing threat since the 1980s. She described this threat in various forms such as financial raids, cyberattacks, predation of strategic information, or the extraterritorial application of foreign laws, highlighting the persistent ambiguity between influence and interference.

She particularly criticized certain decisions, such as allowing a former director of the DGSI to join an American company specializing in compliance with US-imposed economic sanctions, which she saw as a sign of strategic blindness.

The Senator stressed the urgency of clearly identifying rivals and threats in order to develop effective short, medium, and long-term protection tools. She pointed out that despite the growing popularity of the concept of sovereignty in recent public discourse, particularly during European and legislative elections, France remains exposed and vulnerable to the offensive strategies of foreign powers.

In conclusion, she called for collective mobilization to refine the notion of “economic warfare” and strengthen its strategic role within economic, diplomatic, and scientific policies.

Christian Harbulot then presented the stakes of this colloquium and, in particular, explained its title and thus its purpose.

Christian Harbulot is an international expert in economic intelligence. He initiated research on economic confrontation issues and power strategies in the mid-1980s. He co-founded the School of Economic Warfare in 1997. Since the early 2000s, his work has focused on cognitive warfare and information warfare through content. In January 2022, he created CR 451, the EGE’s research center, dedicated to this approach.

According to him, economic warfare is a recent concept that began to be applied and then theorized during the 20th century. It is worth recalling that Winston Churchill was the first Western head of government to create a Ministry of Economic Warfare^[1] at the beginning of the Second World War to combat the Nazi war machine. In France, some historians such as Georges-Henri Soutou^[2] began to give it some visibility in the academic world. But it was the impetus given by the school of thought stemming from economic intelligence that led to the publication of numerous works on the history and challenges of economic warfare, more precisely in peacetime.

Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the notion of economic warfare has now entered the public domain.

To define what the concept of economic warfare covers, C. Harbulot specifies that three fields of application must be differentiated:

• “War economy.” Participation in a military war creates needs that are primarily met by drawing resources from the economy on a large scale. In this context, the state places part of businesses under its control to integrate them into authoritarian planning to guarantee the armed forces the availability of the means they need.
• Wartime economic warfare. It refers to offensive operations to disrupt enemy supply chains and weaken the survival capabilities of the adversary population.
• Peacetime economic warfare is a confrontation between parties to capture, control, seize wealth, and increase their power. It generates a mode of domination that avoids resorting to the use of military power to impose lasting supremacy.

While the notions of “war economy” and the practice of wartime economic warfare are documented in official texts^[3] or academic journals^[4], this is not the case for the notion of peacetime economic warfare. The latter has no official recognition from states and has rarely been addressed in the academic field. There is, however, a French exception in that the School of Economic Warfare has sought to define a first pedagogical approach to the role of information and knowledge in peacetime economic confrontations. This effort was continued in 2022 with the creation of its applied research center, CR451, to carry out in-depth work on how industrial sectors could be affected by peacetime economic warfare practices. This approach resulted in the production of a first report on economic warfare in the plastics industry^[5].

Harbulot then emphasizes the notion of “economic war machines.” It is the examples^[6] drawn from the Asian context that will give peacetime economic warfare a strategic dimension, due to the collective dynamic desired by political power. The reasons that prompt political power to give birth to “economic war machines” can be illustrated by three very different examples:

• Japan’s refusal to be colonized by the Western world.
• South Korea’s desire not to be absorbed by North Korea.
• China’s determination not to change its political model.

Each of these examples shares a common point: the political power’s will to mobilize the country’s vital forces against a major external threat. Such a strategic choice materialized in the creation of genuine economic war machines adapted to the needs of the countries in question. “An economic war machine^[7]” can be defined as the set of technical, financial, and human resources intended to build the foundations of a commercial expansion policy focused on conquering foreign markets.

First example: Japan

At the end of the 19th century, Japan was explicitly threatened by a risk of military confrontation with the United States of America. The letter delivered by Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States Navy to the Shogun proposed either opening trade between the two countries or war. Japan accepted the proposal but opted for an industrialization policy that paved the way for a conquering commercial approach. To give itself the means to succeed in its economic expansion policy^[8], the “Japanese economic war machine” built for this purpose underwent an evolution in several stages: use of a planning system at the beginning of the Meiji era, rise and progressive transformation of private industrial conglomerates, incentive role of administrative bodies (MITI^[9], JETRO^[10]), operational support from trading companies in approaching foreign markets.

Second example: South Korea

After the Korean War, the country had virtually no industry. The Japanese occupier, who ruled the country until 1945, had built them in North Korea). To avoid suffering the repercussions of such a disparity, South Korea authoritatively invented a development matrix that favored the creation of several highly competitive industrial poles. The notion of economic warfare as conceived in Seoul is conditioned by the possibility of a new military confrontation with North Korea.

Third example: Communist China

Harbulot recalls that the collapse of the Soviet Union forced the Chinese Communist Party to modify the Chinese economic system to avoid suffering the same fate. The way in which the policy of extending a hand to the West was conceived demonstrates an art of peacetime economic warfare that deserves to be highlighted. It initially consisted of learning from Japan^[11]. In parallel with this reappropriation of Japanese know-how, China presented it as an opportunity for Western companies to relocate part of their production facilities to certain parts of its territory^[12]. Behind this seemingly advantageous offer (low wages and opportunities to sell Western products on the Chinese domestic market), the Chinese Communist Party aimed to capture the maximum amount of technology transfers.

The speaker highlights the common points of these three examples:

• Shortcut strategies: seeking knowledge outside borders (pretending to be weak to facilitate approaching the strong, in order to learn as much as possible and potentially copy).
• The combination of national and private interest: imposing a patriotic approach towards the outside on business leaders while preserving a certain level of competition in the domestic market.
• The very important role given to economic intelligence.
• A common use of informational offensives.

The Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese experiences have provided evidence of the profitability^[13] of peacetime economic warfare in terms of increasing power. Japan temporarily rose to second place in the world economy at the end of the 1980s. South Korea has become a particularly high-performing industrial power and has so far managed to face the permanent challenge from North Koreans supported by Beijing. Communist China is the second largest economic power in the world in 2025.

The study of peacetime economic warfare must no longer remain a blind spot, as it was until recently. The information society multiplies the vulnerabilities and threats weighing on businesses. Furthermore, the evolution of certain long-term conflicts (e.g., the Middle East) gives economic warfare a global dimension, which de facto creates an interaction between its three fields: peacetime economic warfare (problem of access to water and oil or gas resources), war economy (ability to maintain the level of military equipment), and wartime economic warfare (destruction of port infrastructures and strategic product storage centers).

But as Christian Harbulot reminds us, taking the examples of the uncertainties of the war in Ukraine and those of the wars in the Middle East, the three dimensions of economic warfare are now interactive and cause the hybrid evolution of power relations between powers.

In conclusion, he indicates that it remains true that particular attention must be paid to peacetime economic confrontations, given the weakening of “market laws” in the face of policies of power increase through the economy, as well as the growing importance of the notion of “dependence” between countries seeking economic supremacy and those experiencing it.

1st ROUND TABLE: Economic Warfare: An Essential Concept in International Relations

The first session, moderated by Arnaud de Morgny, brought together Professors Greg Kennedy, Nicolas Moinet, Yves Tiberghien, and Jacques Sapir.

The Rise of the Economic Security Concept in the Indo-Pacific Region.

Professor Yves Tiberghien of the University of British Columbia teaches political science. He is the Emeritus Director of the Asian Research Institute, UBC. Born in France, he has held important positions in Japan, notably at Michelin and as a researcher at the Japanese Ministry of Finance. His academic career includes prestigious stints at Stanford and Harvard, where he completed his doctorate and postdoctoral studies. Based in Canada for 24 years, he now defines himself as Franco-Canadian.

His work primarily focuses on economic security, with a particular interest in North America and Asia (China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan). In 2023, he actively participated in “Track 1.5” dialogues, bringing together think tanks and high-level government officials, centered on economic issues between China and the United States.

According to him, historically, since the 1980s, security and economics were treated separately within governments and international institutions. However, this separation has eroded recently, leading to a profound crisis of the international liberal order as theorized by John Ikenberry. This crisis is notably manifested by a major transition of economic power from Western countries to China and the Global South. The relative decline of the OECD and the G7 in favor of emerging economies has profoundly transformed the global economic landscape and challenged the historical authority of traditional powers.

He highlights the evolution between state behaviors in 2015 and contemporary ones, illustrating the change in their relationships. Indeed, in 2015, trade disputes were settled according to WTO rules. Economy and security fell under different regimes. Major powers met at G20 summits and made progress on global rules. In 2009, they had collectively saved the global economy, and all had signed the Paris agreements. Finally, social networks and AI were not perceived as dangers to democracy.

Today, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body mechanism is blocked by the US veto. A phenomenon of “weaponization[14] of interdependence” has developed. We are in a situation of confrontation between major powers. There is the possibility of a cold war between China and the United States. Political blockages are becoming widespread. The war in Ukraine has almost killed the G20. We are witnessing major tensions over climate and regressive policies. Finally, Mega platforms (Telegram, Twitter-X, FB) and AI seem to have become existential risks.

The blockage of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body, a result of the American veto, symbolizes the evolution towards a world where economic interdependence becomes a major source of strategic vulnerability rather than an opportunity. This dynamic is particularly exacerbated in the context of the technological confrontation between the United States and China, especially concerning digital and green technologies, considered crucial for future economic and security dominance.

Economic security measures refer to actions taken by the state to protect access to essential inputs for the national economy, such as energy, food, water, medicine, capital, technology, intellectual property, infrastructure, and critical components.

They may also include access to critical markets and maritime routes leading to these markets. Different countries emphasize different components and elements.

The typologies of economic security actions are:

• Ensuring credible long-term access to key inputs in a context of declining trust in the global market, as globalization reaches its peak, the WTO and the trading system are paralyzed, and non-commercial measures proliferate.
• Establishing a new optimal balance between the state and the market to achieve a new set of objectives: prosperity, security, and social resilience.
• Protecting against the growing trend of weaponized interdependence, where key actors use asymmetric control of key nodes or chokepoints in the global economy to pressure others (including economic diplomacy).
• Ensuring access to new inputs and establishing a dominant position in essential new technologies (AI and green technologies) that will dominate the economy of the 2030s.
• Addressing increasing geopolitical competition and seeking to deny inputs to rivals’ military establishments. Security concerns also include protecting key physical and virtual socio-economic infrastructures (including against cyberattacks).

Countries like Japan and South Korea have implemented proactive and interventionist policies to strengthen their technological and economic capabilities, particularly in the strategic semiconductor sector. For example, Japan has recently committed massive investments to attract this industry to its territory.

The United States, for its part, has developed a particularly robust set of instruments under the Biden administration, including severe economic sanctions against China and significant subsidies aimed at securing its technological lead, particularly in the artificial intelligence and green technology sectors. This dual approach produces significant externalities, impacting even its European allies.

Canada finds itself in an intermediate situation, marked by a certain ambivalence linked to its historical attachment to the liberal economic order and the rule of law. Faced with new geopolitical realities, the country is nonetheless forced to rethink its economic strategies by integrating the security dimension more deeply, which generates internal tensions and adaptation difficulties.

It is also important to understand that the notion of economic security in the aforementioned cases includes a clear offensive component. What Professor Tiberghien refers to as negative externalities actually encompasses offensive policies within the framework of the economic security concept.

Beyond national cases, all countries in the Indo-Pacific region now seem engaged in an “economic security race,” adopting initial defensive measures that, however, generate significant negative side effects for their neighbors and economic partners. The proliferation of these measures risks triggering a spiral of conflict where the externalities generated exacerbate existing economic and geopolitical tensions.

This complex period is also marked by two simultaneous industrial revolutions: the digital revolution and that of green technologies, disrupting global economic balances and forcing states to position themselves quickly lest they face economic and security decline. Europe, caught between China and the United States, faces an existential dilemma in this intense competition.

He identifies five types of risks:

1. These measures have distorting, or even negative, effects on others.
2. Others are likely to react, leading to an accelerating process of reciprocity, akin to an arms race, which results in a net decrease in security for all, and even for each individual, over time.
3. Contagion effects: in a given economy, economic security measures are a slippery slope (cf. Gita Gopinath at the IMF), both internally and in terms of credible engagement with others. They allow security establishments to secure and de-commodify an increasingly significant portion of the economy.
4. The definition of economic security is very difficult to achieve and varies from country to country, which can lead to an increasing number of countermeasures.
5. If not neutralized, strategic interactions in economic security can lead to the collapse of parts of the global economic system and worsen the situation for everyone.

In conclusion, Professor Tiberghien reiterates that contemporary economic security is a hybrid concept, now closely integrating economic and security logics. This integration disrupts institutional structures and international practices, plunging the world into an era of increased uncertainty. The major challenge today is therefore to find a balance between strategic security and international economic cooperation to avoid a harmful escalation for all.

Economic Warfare in War and Peace

Professor Greg Kennedy teaches Strategic Foreign Policy at King’s College London and joined the Department of Defence Studies in June 2000. He has taught at the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, in the Departments of History and War Studies. He is an adjunct professor at that university. He holds a PhD from the University of Alberta, an MA in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, and an Honours BA in History from the University of Saskatchewan. He has published internationally on issues of strategic foreign policy, maritime defense, disarmament, diplomacy, and intelligence.

Dr. Kennedy’s presentation, titled “Economic Warfare in Peace and War,” explores the contemporary dimensions and challenges of economic warfare, emphasizing that it is not simply a re-edition of the Cold War, but represents a hybrid form integrating various elements from historical conflicts such as the two World Wars or the Franco-Prussian War.

According to him, the international situation is one of peer competition, a new competition between great powers. This is despite the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which is characterized by a conflict of values and not ideology, nor is it bipolarity. Referring to the theory of supercompensation, which describes different phases of reaction to a training effect: the stimulus causes a phase of fatigue then recovery, followed by a period of supercompensation and finally a return to the ex-ante situation. For Professor Kennedy, the period of supercompensation is still far off. We are in the phase of intense training and fatigue, not even in the recovery phase, and there is still a long way to go before reaching supercompensation. However, there are actions to be taken during the intense training period that can make the effects of the supercompensation phase more powerful.

He particularly differentiates tools based on what he calls hot or cold economic warfare. In the case of hot economic warfare, the weapons are embargoes, trade blockades, “strategic bombing,” and preemptive purchases. In the case of cold economic warfare, it involves economic sanctions or diplomatic sanctions.

He indicates that more and more actors are studying the different modalities of economic tensions and that if they do not use the term economic warfare, preferring geo-economics or economic leverage, it is the same reality. He particularly presents Helsinki’s “geo-economics” week, which was organized in August 2024 and dealt with these subjects.

He emphasizes the re-emergence of great powers in the current context, marked by increased globalization, generating tensions and frictions despite international economic interconnectedness.

History has shown that change is important for the international system and that it disrupts previous methodologies of governance and conflict. Previously, it was about methods of control, credit creation, trust in the system. Today, the challenges concern free markets, the movement of goods. The role of the state has considerably increased in all areas, as we saw in the pandemic: the state is the ultimate provider of power.

Professor Kennedy describes a period characterized by Western inertia, a “business as usual” mentality, reflecting a reluctance to modify traditional models of economic management, despite the rapid evolution of the rules of the global economic game. A form of conservatism and maladaptation of the West to changes in the world. This inertia contrasts with the proactive strategy of actors like China, which today holds a major strategic lever with control over 70% of global essential medicine production, thus creating a notable vulnerability for the West. This control could allow China to exert significant economic pressure without resorting to direct military confrontation.

Faced with these new challenges, Professor Kennedy observes a general movement towards greater economic regulation, marking a break with liberal laissez-faire economic doctrines. He advocates for explicitly integrating corporate and financial dimensions into a national economic security matrix to better respond to emerging economic threats. This evolution is visible in various Western countries, such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union, which are progressively tending to establish institutions dedicated to coordinating national economic levers with both defensive and offensive objectives.

The speaker particularly highlights the strategic importance of the maritime domain in current economic warfare. According to him, control of maritime routes is an absolute imperative for the preservation of the liberal international order. He argues that for 250 years, Western economic hegemony has largely relied on its ability to ensure the free movement of goods through international maritime routes, thus ensuring prosperity, credit, and financial stability.

Furthermore, the necessity of integrating artificial intelligence (AI) into economic security strategy is emphasized as indispensable for managing the increasing complexity of economic warfare. AI is identified as a critical tool enabling states to effectively process the massive amount of information required for strategic decision-making in a globalized and highly competitive economic context.

Finally, Professor Kennedy asserts that the Western model of economic warfare must imperatively reconcile with democratic and liberal values to preserve its legitimacy on a global scale. Democracy, according to him, must not be sacrificed for economic security, but rather integrated into a balanced and resilient economic warfare strategy. He recalls that, historically, democracies that have managed to articulate their economic power with their democratic principles have demonstrated a better capacity for adaptation, increased resilience, and thus greater effectiveness.

In conclusion, the speaker calls for abandoning current inertia in favor of a proactive and integrated strategy, involving corporatism, economic regulation, control of critical supply chains, and strengthening of the maritime domain. This strategic shift is an absolute necessity to face the new realities of contemporary economic warfare.

Increasing Power Through the Economy

Professor Nicolas Moinet is a Lecturer-Researcher at the University of Poitiers (IAE – CEREGE) and an associate researcher at CR 451.

Professor Nicolas Moinet begins his presentation by offering an impressionistic overview of the notion of power increase and economic warfare. He highlights the polysemy of the term “economic warfare” and France’s difficulty with polysemous concepts. Contrary to a simplistic analytical vision, he advocates a holistic approach à la Edgar Morin to grasp the complexity of this phenomenon.

The professor notes that there is a general consensus on the effects and manifestations of economic warfare, citing in particular takeovers, cyberattacks, and intrusions, and pays tribute to the DRSD for being one of the first French services to publicly address the notion. However, he insists on the need to go beyond these manifestations and to clearly define what economic warfare is, which inevitably refers to the notion of war. He recalls that the conception of war was marked by the 20th century and its unleashing of lethal violence, which may have obscured more hybrid forms of warfare integrating economics. To better understand current economic warfare, he suggests looking to examples from the 19th and late 20th centuries, probably closer to the current context marked by nuclear deterrence.

According to him, economic warfare is not a metaphor. War, in general, is defined as a collective and organized aggression, an act of violence aimed at the submission of the other by various means: cognitive, informational, economic, or lethal. He quotes Sun Tzu to remind us that the use of lethal force should be a last resort. He highlights the often-hidden nature of acts of economic warfare, masked by an “extremely powerful curtain of conspiracism.” To counter this, he advocates analytical methodologies inspired by archaeology and the indicial paradigm, as well as multidisciplinary approaches integrating political economy. CR 451 defines economic warfare as a confrontation between different stakeholders (states, companies, actors, hackers, NGOs) to capture and control resources, seize wealth, and above all, increase their power through the economy.

He identifies five axes for increasing this power: limiting dependencies (including through interdependence, as in the case of semiconductors), localizing industrial activity, the ability to project onto foreign markets, entering informational competition (the impact of consulting firms, lawyers, etc.), and combating economic predation. He insists on the need to adopt an offensive rather than solely defensive logic. The professor emphasizes the importance of changing strategic paradigms and adopting the perspectives of others, stressing the need for a 360° vision integrating the viewpoints of all countries worldwide. He encourages questioning established ideas and adapting analytical tools.

At CR 451, various analytical frameworks are proposed, including that of “invisible chessboards.” This approach consists of considering not only the classic competitive chessboard but also geo-economic, political, and civil society chessboards, where strategies can be deployed simultaneously. The study of oil in the 19th and 20th centuries, particularly the case of Rockefeller and Standard Oil, illustrates this approach by showing how a company can act on several of these chessboards. The dismantling of Standard Oil is presented as an example of the United States’ ability to strengthen its power by adapting its structures (Cahiers de la guerre économique n°4 & 5 directed by Christian Harbulot, 2021).

The presentation then addresses how this logic of power is handled by “economic war machines,” particularly intelligence, in a differentiated manner across countries. The United Kingdom, a precursor in this field for protecting its empire and oil interests, developed a foreign policy accordingly. The United States used oil as a geopolitical weapon, notably through its alliance with Saudi Arabia. Russia also uses oil as a weapon of resilience. France, for its part, understood these stakes late, but managed, under de Gaulle, to create a patriotic company like Elf to defend its interests.

Professor Moinet refers to Amin Maalouf’s work Le Labyrinthe des égarés (Grasset, 2024) to remind us that the past never dies, illustrating this with Commodore Perry’s forced opening of Japan in 1853, a demonstration of power that compelled Japan to open to trade. This opening led to a model of power increase through the economy, initially characterized by economic espionage to catch up technologically. After World War II, Japan focused on economic development with state aid, experiencing rapid growth and becoming a global economic power in the 1980s thanks to information technologies. Faced with Japan’s rising economic power, the United States commissioned the CIA’s Japan 2000 report (1991), which revealed the implementation of a powerful and discreet Japanese economic intelligence doctrine. This report led the United States to make the defense of its economic interests its number one priority after the near disappearance of the Soviet Union. They focused on Silicon Valley and the “immaterial world” of information technologies, with the goal of leading the private information market. However, they had not anticipated China’s resilience and rise, which developed its own internet network and trade routes.

China’s rapid catch-up is partly explained by the technology transfer imposed on foreign companies wishing to access its market. Today, China is in a phase of its own innovation, with Chinese researchers being awarded Nobel prizes. The United States observes this evolution with anxiety, and relations have deteriorated with the trade war launched by Donald Trump, perceived as the beginning of a new form of warfare.

Professor Moinet insists on the need for France to understand foreign analytical frameworks, particularly that of the United Kingdom, whose intelligence service clearly states an objective of economic prosperity. He cites important doctrinal works not translated into French, such as Marc Galeotti’s The Weaponization of Everything (2023) and Richard Daveni’s Strategic Supremacy (2007). Daveni proposes thinking about the business world with geopolitical schemes, focusing on disrupting and destroying competitive advantages, and defining strategic zones (core market, vital interests, containment zones, pivot zone). He regrets the lack of connection in France between academic reflection and political decision-making, unlike in the United States where think tanks and academics play an important role.

The example of key technologies and their positioning according to Daveni’s analytical framework (semiconductors in vital interests, leading to confrontation with China) is illuminating. Professor Moinet also mentions the role of government agencies, consulting firms, and the circulation of people between the public and private sectors in the United States, creating an impressive “war machine.” He cites the National Economic Council as a central player in this strategy. He mentions the success of the book Chip War, which illustrates the semiconductor war, an area where Europe struggles to compete. He advocates for an administrative and political system connected to strategic thinking and introduces the notion of systemic economic warfare, coined by Christian Harbulot, where, through an informational process and cognitive dominance, an adversary is subdued. He illustrates this with the example of American foundations funding anti-speciesist movements aimed at developing the artificial meat market.

Finally, it is crucial to move beyond the sequential peace-crisis-war paradigm, which suits a siloed political-administrative system. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Thierry Burkhard, proposes an analytical framework in terms of competition – contestation – confrontation, which CR 451 transposes into its domain as competition – modeling – destabilization – destruction.

To illustrate this latter framework, the professor takes the example of the transition to electric vehicles. While China announced ambitious electric car targets in 2008, France remained focused on specific models. China then acted on modeling by increasing its presence in standardization bodies (ISO) and influencing European countries via the “16+1” group to vote for the end of internal combustion vehicles by 2035, thereby favoring the electric vehicle market where it is ahead. China also targeted the weak link of car rental companies. Despite warnings in the press, Europe failed to conduct counter-information warfare and continued to reason in terms of classic competition, relying on attractiveness with the creation of “Gigafactories,” whose results have so far been disappointing. The arrival of Chinese manufacturers like BYD in Hungary rather than France illustrates this difficulty. The statements by the CEO of Renault before the Senate highlight the lack of impact analysis of the European decision to end internal combustion vehicles, particularly regarding access to raw materials needed for batteries. This situation leads to a destabilization, or even destruction, of the European automotive industry, as highlighted by press articles and analyses from The Economist Intelligence Unit, which evoke a risk for Europe of being “swallowed up” in the Sino-American economic rivalry.

Professor Moinet concludes by emphasizing that we know what needs to be done, as recommended by reports such as the economic intelligence mission, but that it is necessary to act with adequate means and overcome cultural blockages. He insists on the need to reconnect with a culture of cunning, recalling that works such as Les Ruses de l’intelligence by Marcel Détienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant (Champs Essais, 1974) or La Ruse et la force by historian Jean-Vincent Holeindre (Perrin, 2017), highlight France’s difficulty in naming these conflicts of cunning as “wars,” preferring an approach based on force, which constitutes more than ever a strategic handicap.

Economic Warfare: What Are We Talking About?

Jacques Sapir is a French economist renowned for his work on political economy, financial crises, and economic sovereignty. A former Director of Studies at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS), he also directs the Centre d’études des modes d’industrialisation (CEMI).

The notion of “economic warfare,” according to Jacques Sapir, presents a notable polysemy, as it covers phenomena ranging from a simple state of economic competition to genuine strategic conflicts, structured around a friend/enemy logic. In France, this notion is often defined by economic intelligence specialists as a state strategy aimed at asserting its power on the international stage through various means such as economic, financial, technological, legal, political, and societal information. E. Delbecque and C. Harbulot particularly emphasize its proximity to cognitive and informational warfare, inscribed in a dynamic of asymmetric warfare for the benefit of a global state power. This conceptualization highlights a parallel evolution with the theoretical development of strategy itself, recognized by both historians and political science specialists.

Historically, economic warfare is intrinsically linked to military conflicts, as it aimed to weaken the adversary by directly attacking their economic base, but it proves incapable of grasping the entire phenomenon of economic warfare, particularly in the current period (post-World War II).

Sapir thus recalls that this practice dates back to antiquity, illustrated by Hannibal’s destruction of Roman agricultural resources during the Second Punic War to weaken enemy resistance. Until the 18th century, as long as war was more a matter of men than material, the financial dimension remained central, with the famous adage stating “to wage war, three things are needed: money, money, and more money.”

At that time, strategies aimed at depriving the enemy of financial resources already became a strategic objective pursued even in peacetime. This is evidenced by Colbert’s policy in France, favoring national production and the export of high-value-added products to attract gold and silver flows into the kingdom and prevent their outflow. Similarly, piracy practices tolerated by major European powers in peacetime, then institutionalized in wartime as “privateering,” were intended to disrupt enemy financial flows, particularly Spanish ones, and reduce the economic capacity of adversaries.

With the Industrial Revolution, Jacques Sapir emphasizes that economic warfare took on a new dimension, marked by the increased importance of logistics and the industrial capacity of states. The American experience during the Civil War, then in the Russo-Turkish and Russo-Japanese conflicts, and even more so in World War I, perfectly illustrates the industrialization of conflicts and the militarization of industry. In the United States, the creation of the Army Industrial College in 1924 symbolized this awareness, an institution analyzing not only national industrial mobilization capabilities but also those of other world powers, thus foreshadowing modern thinking on economic warfare. The Industrial College played an important role both in developing a doctrine of industrial mobilization and in its implementation from 1941.

However, J. Sapir insists on a major evolution: economic warfare is no longer exclusively subordinate to military warfare. In the 19th century, modern protectionism theorists, notably Friedrich List and Henry Charles Carey, developed the idea of “peacetime economic warfare” conducted independently of armed conflicts, specifically aimed at challenging British economic supremacy. List, exiled in the United States, proposed a policy of industrial protectionism to allow less developed states to build autonomous economic sovereignty, thus foreshadowing modern concepts of domestic market protection and economic sovereignty. Carey, for his part, developed a virulent critique of British free trade, accused of perpetuating economic dominance through a disguised form of economic warfare against other nations.

For these two men, Great Britain was therefore pursuing a war of domination, but by other means: the domination of its economy. Opposing this domination, enabling other countries to achieve what was not yet called “economic sovereignty,” thus became a legitimate objective.

These protectionist theories had a considerable influence outside their countries of origin, particularly in Japan and Russia. In Russia, List’s thought directly inspired major figures such as Serge Witte and Dmitri Mendeleev, who developed economic policies based on raising customs tariffs to protect and develop national industry. Similarly, in Japan, protectionist theories disseminated by the Meirokusha and the National Economy Association contributed to the construction of an independent and sovereign industrial economy at the turn of the 20th century. Thus, protectionism became, according to J. Sapir, a true “war of economic emancipation,” essential for the emergence of certain major modern industrial powers.

In contemporary times, J. Sapir observes that economic warfare extends far beyond the state framework, integrating new dimensions such as economic sanctions, campaigns to discredit foreign industries, institutionalized practices of counterfeiting and combating it, as well as the manipulation of information via media and cultural tools like cinema. This complexification is accompanied by a loss by states of the “traditional monopoly of economic violence,” now shared with large international firms and sometimes delegated to NGOs or secret state agencies. Multinational corporations can thus use tactics once reserved for states, amplifying the scope and impact of these practices. Multinational companies sometimes act as quasi-states, applying their own forms of economic regulations and exerting influence on national policies through lobbying and other influence mechanisms.

Jacques Sapir thus concludes that contemporary economic warfare still fundamentally relies on states’ desire to preserve their economic sovereignty while weakening that of their competitors. Through various practices such as control of strategic sectors, control of foreign investments, attraction of talent and foreign companies, as well as the creation of real or perceived structural dependencies, this economic warfare remains a central issue for strengthening the strategic position of nations on the world stage, often at the expense of international cooperation and multilateralism.

^2nd Roundtable: Economic War Machines

The second session, moderated by Nicolas Moinet, brought together Christian Harbulot, Professor Jean-Philippe Eiglinger, and Ali Moutaïb.

Power in “Peacetime” Economic Warfare

According to Christian Harbulot, understanding a concept is facilitated by the officialization of its strategic dimension on the international stage. This is the case for “war economy” as well as for “wartime economic warfare.” But this is not the case for “peacetime economic warfare.”

For him, this represents a missing link in the study of economic warfare. The two world wars of the 20th century demonstrated the importance of logistical means to support the action of armed forces. The invasion of part of Ukrainian territory by Russia has updated this perception of the strategic dimension of the “war economy” in the functioning of a country. It is notably the capacity to withstand a high-intensity shock that has prompted politicians to question the means to achieve it. In France, the debate produced in the Senate^[15] by the new Military Programming Law highlighted the insufficiency of ammunition and the difficulties, due to a lack of sufficient political will over the past twenty years, in considering the usefulness of a “war economy.” As the Foundation for Strategic Research^[16] recalls, the continuation of a major war on Europe’s flank has led political authorities over the past two years to evoke the need to define the strategic axes of an industrial policy commensurate with our needs.

In an even more distant past, “wartime economic warfare” gave rise to strategic reflection, particularly to combat war contraband^[17]. In February 1909, the declaration concerning the law of maritime warfare was defined at a conference in London. Its Article 24^[18] lists objects and materials considered war contraband and capable of serving both war and peaceful uses, and included under the name of conditional contraband. Fueled by the record of German practices during the First World War, the question of neutral countries using their status to serve as transit for illicit trade with countries involved in a conflict took on a major strategic dimension, as analyzed by René Cassin^[19] on the eve of the Second World War.

But what about, Christian Harbulot emphasizes, the level of strategic perception concerning “peacetime economic warfare,” the third constitutive part of the concept of economic warfare? It must be noted that we are approaching a kind of black hole here. No state has taken an official position on the subject. The same applies to international conferences such as Davos^[20] or the G20^[21]. This topic of reflection is not currently on their agenda. How can such an “oversight” be explained?

The second part of the definition of war in the dictionary of the Académie Française^[22] nevertheless legitimizes the need for an answer to this question:

“By extension. Organized confrontation opposing nations or human groups by means other than armed force. Economic war, commercial war. Revolutionary or subversive war, by which insurrectional movements are provoked or exploited to weaken an adversary. War of the airwaves, of communiqués, which uses information organs. Psychological warfare, propaganda aimed at weakening the morale of the adversary.”

The relationship between the notion of power and “peacetime economic warfare.” The limits of achievements resulting from military victories^[23] are an incentive to examine other means of preserving or increasing a country’s power outside of recourse to strictly military warfare. The historical experiences that guide us in this research are very different depending on the contexts.

The European context was a precursor in this regard. The confrontation between France and European monarchies after the 1789 Revolution generated economic warfare practices that went beyond the framework of “war economy” or “economic warfare in wartime.” To catch up with the delay accumulated compared to the British Industrial Revolution, Napoleon I decided to mobilize all non-military forces to acquire the knowledge that was lacking in the French industrial infrastructure. He appointed a chemist, Jean Antoine Chaptal, in charge of the Ministry of the Interior to protect national manufactures but also to stimulate a new economic dynamic in agriculture, trade, and industry.

Beyond the strictly state framework, he initiated embryonic “peacetime economic warfare” initiatives. The founding of the Society for the Encouragement of National Industry in 1801 was part of the spirit of this new policy, which sought to promote innovation in the service of national interest. All possible means were used at the time, including recourse to engineers, to acquire and in some cases plunder British industrial knowledge: surprise reports, illegal importation of machines, industrial espionage.

After the defeat of Napoleon’s armies in 1815, the return to peace did not end the economic confrontations between the former belligerents. The British government sought to weaken the protectionist system^[24] to prevent products from British manufactures from invading the French domestic market. London devised an indirect influence strategy to end the economic defense system put in place by France in the period preceding the Restoration.

To achieve this “peacetime economic warfare” objective, London commissioned an English parliamentarian, John Bowring^[25], to establish contacts in the former English territories with entrepreneurs who suffered from the taxation imposed on their products. He had dozens of articles published in 16 regional newspapers to denounce the excesses of the customs legislation applied in France. The results of this campaign can be measured by the reaction of the Minister of Commerce at the time, Adolphe Thiers, who accused Bowring of having put the South of France in a state of insurrection. But it should not be forgotten that the objective of these influence operations was to facilitate the access of products from British manufactures to the French domestic market.

As Christian Harbulot specifies, London again commissioned John Bowring by appointing him Governor of Hong Kong. The latter was directly involved in 1856 during the Second Opium War, to force China^[26] to open up to world trade, that is, primarily with Great Britain.

This historical period combines both situations of war and precarious peace. It illustrates the three facets of economic warfare:

• “War economy” to ensure the functioning of armies.
• Wartime economic warfare in the conduct of continental and maritime blockades.
• And the emergence of “peacetime economic warfare,” materialized by the pursuit of British commercial supremacy.

As Christian Harbulot concludes, peacetime economic warfare then takes on its full demonstrative dimension in defining power beyond the induced effects of military warfare.

Moroccan War Machines: Aspects of Sovereignty and Influence

Ali Moutaïb is a trainer, publisher, and expert in strategic intelligence. He is the program director of the School of Economic Warfare in Morocco and head of the strategic intelligence firm Hyperboree Advisors.

1. Moutaib presents that in a multipolar world marked by intensifying economic confrontations, the question of adapting the concept of an economic war machine to emerging powers is of paramount importance. Beyond classic models of economic power, new actors like Morocco are disrupting established norms by developing economic strategies tailored to their specific realities.

For a developing country, an economic war machine is defined as the coordinated orchestration of national resources to defend its economic sovereignty and project its influence, while creating levers of power adapted to its means. The Moroccan case demonstrates the relevance and feasibility of such an approach for ambitious middle powers. By combining political stability, geographical advantages, strategic resources, and an industrial vision, Morocco has managed to develop an offensive economic strategy that allows it to establish itself as a key player in Africa and beyond.

1. Moutaib then questions the structural foundations of the Moroccan strategy. The Kingdom of Morocco relies on a set of fundamental assets that form the basis of its economic strategy. Its geographical position, at the junction between Europe and Africa, makes it a natural crossroads for trade and a gateway between continents. This strategic location is reinforced by remarkable political stability in a region marked by recurrent turbulence, offering a favorable environment for investment and growth.

In terms of natural resources, Morocco holds a major competitive advantage with control of 70% of the world’s phosphate reserves, a critical resource for global food security. This control not only allows it to generate substantial revenues but also to exert significant geoeconomic influence. At the same time, the country has embarked on an ambitious energy transition, aiming to achieve 52% renewable energy in its energy mix by 2030, with flagship projects such as the Noor solar power plant.

Moroccan infrastructure, which is world-class, also plays a key role in its strategy. The Tanger Med port complex, the largest port in the Mediterranean and Africa, ranked among the top twenty globally for container traffic, illustrates this logistical excellence. Finally, the Moroccan diaspora, comprising several million members, constitutes a network of economic and cultural influence, while efficient intelligence services support the country’s overall strategy.

Secondly, A. Moutaib presents the strategic axes deployed by Morocco. Morocco has deployed several mechanisms to transform its structural assets into levers of economic power. The African Atlantic Initiative (AAI) is one of its major pillars. A true backbone of Moroccan geoeconomic projection, this initiative aims to create a co-prosperity zone along the African Atlantic coast, positioning Morocco as a logistical and industrial hub. It also strengthens regional food security, thanks to the expertise of the OCP (Office Chérifien des Phosphates), while opening new prospects for cooperation with Latin America and the Caribbean.

Another emblematic project is the Morocco-Nigeria gas pipeline, which illustrates the use of economic soft power. This 6,000 km megaproject is not limited to its energy dimension: it creates strategic cooperation with thirteen West African countries, consolidating Morocco’s regional influence. By connecting Nigerian gas resources to European markets, it acts as a catalyst for industrialization and development for the countries it crosses, while meeting the energy needs of Moroccan industry, particularly automotive.

Pan-African financial presence constitutes a third strategic axis. Moroccan financial institutions are now present in over twenty-five African countries, forming a considerable network of economic influence. This presence goes beyond simple geographical extension to become a tool for power projection, facilitating Moroccan investments and strengthening regional economic cooperation.

In terms of industrialization, Morocco capitalizes on its strategic resources, particularly phosphates and cobalt, to integrate into global value chains for future technologies. The electric battery sector illustrates this approach, with the ambition to master the entire value chain via a gigafactory ecosystem. This strategy is accompanied by a sophisticated policy for attracting foreign investment, combining tax advantages and workforce training.

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic revealed Morocco’s ability to switch to a war economy in times of crisis. Faced with global shortages of medical equipment, the country mobilized its industrial fabric to produce masks and medical supplies, demonstrating valuable responsiveness in managing external shocks.

The third point raised by Mr. Moutaib concerns coordination and implementation mechanisms. For him, the major challenge for developing countries lies in the effective coordination of different economic actors. To strengthen its power projection, Morocco will need to implement several key mechanisms. Currently, the Kingdom relies primarily on its greatest soft-power asset, the Monarchy, as illustrated by the 2018 royal tour in Africa, which opened up many economic opportunities. To amplify this strategy, economic intelligence should play a central role, particularly through the creation of a Directorate General of Economic Security capable of anticipating crises and developing mitigation strategies. The qualified diaspora also represents potential to be further mobilized as an influence network, while a more sophisticated strategic watch system could be deployed in African markets targeted by the South-South policy.

Inter-ministerial coordination will need to be strengthened by establishing a High Council for Economic Security, centralizing data and supporting national companies. Public-private sectoral task forces will need to be deployed, while economic diplomacy is activated to negotiate trade agreements and protect Moroccan investments. Public-private partnerships are encouraged, particularly through the formation of consortia for major international projects, integrating local startups to foster innovation. The pooling of economic intelligence resources and the implementation of specialized training programs complete this system. The feedback from The School of Economic Warfare – Rabat campus ensures the sustainability of the system by creating a pool of economic intelligence experts adapted to the African context.

The speaker concludes by indicating that Morocco has transformed the theoretical concept of an economic war machine into an operational reality. By articulating a strategic vision, mobilizing resources, and intelligently exploiting its comparative advantages, the Kingdom has strengthened its economic sovereignty while increasing its regional influence. This model offers valuable lessons for developing countries: the importance of a clear vision, the coordination of national actors, and a projection of power adapted to available means. The Moroccan case proves that a middle power can, through an offensive economic strategy, transform its constraints into opportunities and its limited resources into levers of lasting influence. In an era of multipolarity, mastering the tools of economic warfare is no longer reserved for major powers but becomes a necessity for any state aspiring to defend its sovereign interests in an increasingly competitive international environment.

Vietnam between Bamboo Diplomacy and Economic Warfare: From Defensive to Offensive?

Jean-Philippe Eglinger is a specialist in contemporary Vietnam, a recognized expert in economic intelligence and international strategy. Associate Lecturer (MAST) and Research Fellow at Inalco (Plidam), he lived in Hanoi for over 15 years and has worked closely with Vietnam for over 30 years. He regularly consults for companies and international organizations on economic, geopolitical, and security issues related to Southeast Asia.

Following a methodological presentation emphasizing the necessary work of reading and arranging primary Vietnamese sources dealing with the subject and published by official Vietnamese media. This approach to the country through the “sensory” (language, culture, physical terrain) allowing to “(com)prehend its point of view” to grasp its representations as closely as possible is the deliberate choice adopted by the speaker in order to operate a “decentering” necessary for a better understanding of the “source” of the phenomena studied, thereby limiting the risk of an ethnocentric “cognitive bias” on the part of the analyst.

Jean-Philippe Eglinger recalls that Vietnam is approaching the fortieth anniversary of its “Renewal” (Đổi mới) policy, launched in 1986. This characterizes an original path of development, combining rapid international economic integration with strict maintenance of internal political control. This strategic choice, initiated at the 6th Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party, initially responded to an urgent necessity: to avoid economic isolation after the foreseeable disappearance of the Soviet Union. From the 1990s, Vietnam progressively opened its economy to foreign investment, international trade, and technology transfers. This dynamic accelerated sharply at the beginning of the 21st century, notably due to the Sino-American economic conflict, leading to a significant industrial relocation from China to Vietnam.

This transformation has enabled Vietnam to experience remarkable growth, with GDP per capita rising from 200 USD in the early 1990s to nearly 4400 USD in 2024, positioning the country as one of the most open economies globally (Vietnam’s foreign trade value (imports + exports) in 2023 is approximately 1.5 times the country’s GDP).

However, Jean-Philippe Eglinger emphasizes that this economic openness is systematically accompanied by a vigorous and constant policy of “economic warfare” through an increase in economic power serving the authorities and the country’s population with the stated goal of national sovereignty.

One of the components of this economic warfare is “economic security,” and even if this concept remains relatively unformalized legally in Vietnam, it constitutes a fundamental pillar for national security, aiming to guarantee economic stability and protect the country from internal and external risks.

This economic integration has thus taken place under close political and security supervision. Vietnam has implemented a set of control mechanisms, notably the concentration of foreign investments in over 500 clearly delimited economic zones managed by central and local political and administrative authorities.

Furthermore, the authorities constantly try to reduce their economic dependence on specific external partners, particularly China (trade balance deficit) and the United States (large trade balance surpluses), which nevertheless exert strong pressure on the Vietnamese economy. In addition, the Vietnamese government relies heavily on Vietnamese residing abroad, soliciting their financial, technical, and relational resources to strengthen the national economy.

Jean-Philippe Eglinger indicates that as early as the 1990s, an economic security doctrine was put in place by the Vietnamese authorities, adopting a pragmatic and essentially defensive approach. Economic security is the materialization of a state policy aimed at protecting and promoting the strategic interests of a nation. In its defensive aspect, economic security includes the following activities: heritage protection, delimitation of critical industrial and technological perimeters, and the fight against foreign economic intelligence activities. From an offensive perspective, it notably involves supporting the international development of firms.

Specific legal and institutional frameworks have been established to protect economic sectors deemed strategic, such as energy, defense, and telecommunications. This has resulted in the creation of large public enterprises, followed by the emergence of powerful private groups, closely linked to political power and nicknamed “Vietnamese red capitalists.” This market economy, described as “socialist-oriented,” now enshrined in the Constitution since 2013 in its Article 51, consecrates the central and driving role of the State in vital sectors, de facto restricting access to these markets for both national and foreign private actors.

Moreover, J-P Eglinger observes that this policy relies on a solid legal framework, continuously reinforced by political directives such as Directive 05-CT/TW (October 14, 2006) or Politburo Resolution No. 51-NQ/TW of September 5, 2019, on the strategy for protecting national security. These texts aim to combat potential threats to economic sovereignty, whether they originate from outside or inside the country. Added to this is the growing mobilization of the national defense industry, of which the Viettel group is an emblematic example. The latter has become a major player in both the civil and military technological sectors, illustrating the evolution of a now more offensive economic security strategy. The recent Law on National Defense and Industrial Mobilization (2024), which establishes a specific fund dedicated to strategic projects in the fields of defense and security, confirms this trend.

The informational competition implemented by Vietnam to support its economic development is significant. It plays on traditional Vietnamese values (education, respect) as well as the recognized qualities of its workers (trained, hardworking, meticulous, etc.) and the landscapes of Vietnam. It does not hesitate to produce and perpetuate certain stereotypes that correspond to foreign perceptions: Indochina, conical hats, El Dorado, a small China economically… This allows for a filter between foreign perception and Vietnamese reality.

Control of critical infrastructure and cybersecurity management have also been strengthened by rigorous regulations. For example, Decree 147/2024/ND-CP requires foreign companies operating in Vietnam to store collected data locally, revealing an explicit desire to maintain strong national sovereignty over data and informational flows.

However, J-P Eglinger notes that the main challenges facing Vietnam now lie in the difficult balance between the imperatives of the central government and the economic development needs of the provinces, which are highly dependent on increasing foreign investment, particularly from China. This dependence constitutes a risk to the country’s economic security, increasing the possibilities of external interference.

Faced with these risks, the Vietnamese Communist Party is intensifying its internal control over political and economic cadres, aiming to prevent ideological deviations, corruption, or hostile infiltrations. The continuous reaffirmation of the central importance of economic development combined with a rigorous security imperative thus constitutes a crucial element of this strategy. The PCV’s thinking could be summarized by this slogan: “economic development remains at the heart of the Party’s concerns, and its imperative construction requires strengthening national defense and security as a key and permanent task. To do this, it is necessary to strongly intertwine the economy with defense and security.”

Finally, J-P Eglinger emphasizes that this policy necessarily requires active public participation. Citizens are called upon to contribute directly to national economic security, notably by reporting illicit activities and monitoring risks.

In conclusion, according to J-P Eglinger, the desired results of state management on security and order in the economic sphere aim to contribute to improving the legal system, management mechanisms, policies, the investment and business environment, to build an increasingly synchronous market economy, to establish links with regional and global markets, to bring the country into sustainable and in-depth economic integration, to create the premise for promoting the country’s industrialization and modernization in the future, while remaining firmly anchored to the principles of a socialist-oriented market economy in a world where democratic countries seem to be going through an “existential” crisis.

Thus, the Vietnamese association of controlled economic openness with a rigorous economic security strategy offers an original model of state development under strong political control. This approach allows Vietnam to sustainably strengthen its economic power with the aim of asserting its sovereignty; an objective made more imperative and difficult in an international context of increased competition between major economic and technological powers.

1st Key Witness: Interview with an “Economic Hit Man”

The organizers broadcast an interview between John Perkins, Nicolas Moinet, and Arnaud de Morgny, recorded on May 26, 2024.

John Perkins is an American economist and author globally known for writing “Confessions of an Economic Hit Man,” which in its three editions has sold over 3 million copies and been translated into nearly 40 languages.

In this interview, J. Perkins recounts his past as an “economic hit man,” and he knows very well what he is talking about because, in his own words: “I myself was an economic hit man.”

In 1968, with the help of a contact in the National Security Agency (NSA), he joined the Peace Corps, an independent American federal agency that sends volunteers around the world to help foreign peoples develop. At the end of this experience, he was recruited by a particular type of consulting firm: it was responsible for setting up economic warfare operations using international financial institutions.

According to him, economic hit men are highly paid professionals who defraud billions of dollars from various countries around the globe. They channel money from the World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – which gives another dimension to recent American decisions – and other “humanitarian” organizations into the coffers of large corporations and the pockets of a few very wealthy families who control the planet’s natural resources, always according to his own words.

Their main weapons are gathered in 4 pillars:

• Fraudulent financial reports to create justifications for loans that exceed countries’ repayment capacities, thus forcing them to sell their primary resources, to agree to privatize their public services for the benefit of American companies, or to accept the construction of American military bases,
• Rigged elections to bring to power or keep in power actors aligned with the interests of either the United States or American companies,
• Techniques similar to those used by the mafia: corruption, extortion, sexual compromise – which amounts to blackmail.
• Finally, murder organized by what he calls the “jackals.”

The interest of this testimony is that it evokes a dimension of economic warfare rarely studied: economic warfare between states through international organizations. Case studies often deal with economic wars in the private sector between companies and sometimes economic wars between companies or economic sectors supported by states, almost never economic warfare directly between states.

3rd Roundtable: How Have Certain States Resisted High-Intensity Economic Warfare Actions?

This session, moderated by Nicolas Moinet, brought together Professors Mehrdad Vahabi and Dmitri Kuvaline.

Sanctions and Political Capitalism: The Iranian Case

Mehrdad Vahabi is a professor of economics at Sorbonne Paris North University and is qualified to supervise research. He directs the Paris North Economics Center-CEPN, an affiliate of the CNRS.

In his presentation “Sanctions and Political Capitalism: The Iranian Case,” Professor Vahabi studies the paradoxical inefficiency of economic sanctions, despite their increasing frequency, from the perspective of political capitalism, and more specifically that of Iran.

Conventional economic theories, as formulated by Murray C. Kemp, assume that sanctions inflict welfare losses that compel targeted countries to comply and thus submit to the injunction that is their origin. However, empirical research, as highlighted by scholars such as Hufbauer et al., suggests that sanctions rarely achieve their intended political results and that their effectiveness significantly diminishes after approximately three years.

Vahabi resolves this paradox by asserting that contemporary sanctions have become instruments of political capitalism, where trade and finance are martialized, blurring commercial and political objectives. Particularly after 2000, sanctions have gone beyond simple embargoes, notably illustrated by U.S. policies such as FIRRMA and ECRA, transforming economic warfare into a profitable enterprise for influential political and commercial groups in both issuing and receiving countries.

This martialization or politicization of trade is what he explains in terms of “political capitalism.” The distinction between political capitalism and market capitalism was initially formulated by Max Weber (1905/1985, 1922/1978). Whereas market capitalism refers to the realization of monetary profits through competitive markets (commodity or currency exchanges, industrial production by modern corporations, etc.), political capitalism is based on the realization of monetary profits through non-market channels, particularly the use of political means for rent-seeking purposes. According to Weber, political capitalism precedes modern nineteenth-century capitalism and dates back to antiquity and the Middle Ages. He particularly emphasized the importance of political capitalism in the Roman and Chinese empires during wartime and suggested that the fall of the Roman Empire was due to the destabilizing role of political capitalism.

Applying this perspective to Iran, Vahabi distinguishes between traditional sanctions (pre-2000) aimed at limiting regional influence and more sophisticated “smart sanctions” post-2000, which primarily target financial institutions and oil exports. He identifies two peak periods of sanctions—2011-2014 under Ahmadinejad and 2018-2019 under the Trump administration—briefly interrupted by the JCPOA agreement in 2015.

Econometric analyses using structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) methods and synthetic control methods (SCM) estimate that Iran has suffered substantial economic losses. Between 2011 and 2022, sanctions resulted in an overall GDP decline of approximately 15 to 20%, exceeding the economic costs of the Iran-Iraq War. Financial sanctions have been particularly effective and have had an unequal impact on different sectors, exacerbating vulnerabilities in rural areas, low-income groups, the less educated, and female employment groups.

Nevertheless, sanctions have also inadvertently strengthened Iran’s Shia political capitalism, notably through the principle of Anfal, a theological construct asserting the Supreme Leader’s exclusive property rights over unclaimed or confiscated assets. This doctrine justifies the creation of giant Islamic holdings (Bonyad, Setad, Khatam al-Anbiya, Astan Qods Razavi) that control more than 60% of the Iranian economy under the control of Supreme Leader Khamenei. These institutions, not subject to the state, directly benefit from sanctions by seizing resources abandoned by foreign companies.

This system institutes a Shia political capitalism based on legal confiscation of property, the fusion of political power and ownership, economic predation at the expense of production, and the domination of a religious and military oligarchy.

Vahabi thus theorizes an “impossible triangle” between Anfal (Islamic institutions of exclusive ownership), privatization, and economic opening (notably to Western investments). According to him, it is impossible to combine these three elements. Each political era in Iran corresponds to an unstable equilibrium. Under Rafsanjani: opening + Anfal → failure of privatization. Under Ahmadinejad: Anfal + privatization → economic closure. Under Khatami: privatization + opening → weakening of Anfal.

Consequently, enduring sanctions become instruments that do not primarily aim to enforce rules, but are rather perpetuated by the mutual interests of political capitalist factions in issuing and receiving nations. For Iran, sanctions have created an environment conducive to deepening Shia political capitalism, reinforcing the economic control of religious and paramilitary institutions closely linked to political elites, thus transforming a supposed external economic punishment into a catalyst for internal consolidation of power.

In other words, according to Mehrdad, the sanctions paradox can only be resolved if there are major interest groups in both “issuing” and “receiving” countries that can profit from sanctions. In such circumstances, issuers and/or receivers would have an interest in finding an equilibrium that perpetuates economic warfare as a means of realizing profits. “Resilience” is then nothing more than tacit shared interests in maintaining low-intensity economic warfare over a long period. Thus, enemies can sometimes be useful friends.

The Impact of Western Sanctions on the Russian Economy

Professor Dimitri Kuvaline holds a doctorate in economics and is Deputy Director and Head of the Laboratory for Analysis and Forecasting of Microeconomic Processes in Moscow.

Professor Kuvaline emphasizes how the Russian economy has managed to adapt to these sanctions and the factors that have contributed to this apparent resilience.

The professor emphasizes that contrary to expectations, the Russian economy is performing well, particularly in 2023 and the first half of 2024. He highlights the impressive growth of key macroeconomic indicators, notably the growth rate of fixed capital investment (nearly 10% in 2023 and 11% in the first half of 2024).

The professor asserts that official statistics are corroborated by data collected by his laboratory from Russian companies. He cites a survey showing a strong acceleration of production investment projects in 2024, with 64% of respondents reporting they are currently undertaking them.

The investment intentions of Russian companies also show a clear upward trend in 2024.

According to him, the Russian economy has weathered many shocks over the past 30 years, developing expertise in managing them. The professor compares the Russian economy to a “highly trained athlete” in resisting shocks. He notes that the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic was perceived as stronger than international sanctions by companies.

The latter favored active adaptation methods (seeking new suppliers and markets, modernization) rather than passive ones (layoffs, wage and investment reductions).

The imposed limitation on capital exports led to a reorientation of funds toward the domestic economy, providing necessary financial support after a period of shortage.

The professor asserts that the choice not to resolve “military problems” by reducing living standards has helped limit social tensions and maintain support for economic processes. The professor even claims that according to the figures, quality of life would be improving.

Certain additional factors favor the adaptation of the Russian economy to external pressures. The significant expansion of trade with friendly and neutral countries has compensated for losses related to withdrawal from Western markets. The increase in military production has had a significant positive impact on several sectors (mechanical engineering, microelectronics, IT) including non-military ones. There was also the emergence of market niches (windfall effect) after the departure of certain Western companies: Russian companies were able to develop more rapidly in various sectors (agriculture, agri-food, chemicals, IT, tourism). Certain anticipatory policies reduced the impacts of certain Western decisions.

Professor Kuvaline welcomes what he calls “success stories.” Thus, the anticipated creation of the national payment system (Mir) to replace SWIFT enabled an overnight transition from one system to another, or the policy of developing the transport network for foreign trade (ports, railways) facilitated reorientation toward other partners. Added to these are federal government sectoral support measures (construction, agriculture, IT, tourism, SMEs) aimed at supporting the transition to an economy under sanctions.

Another favorable factor was the rise in global prices of certain Russian exports in 2022: gas, coal, non-ferrous metals, mineral fertilizers.

Another form of adaptation is the rapid formation of a “shadow fleet” of unidentified vessels for transporting oil and gas. It is said that approximately 600 ships and 50 tankers transport Russian oil and petroleum products as well as liquid gas.

He also specifies the establishment of growing cooperation with other countries under Western sanctions. He gives as an example the growing economic cooperation with Iran and Afghanistan.

Regarding the reliability of the data presented, the professor acknowledges that the only source of information on inflation is the Russian statistical agency (Rosstat). He expresses his confidence in the professionals of this agency, despite the absence of alternative sources.

On the risks that exist for the Russian economy, he specifies that in the event of economic tensions with China, he identifies two major problems for Russian producers in this scenario: reduced access to advanced technologies and potential dependence on a single partner. He estimates that Chinese partners could substitute part of the advanced technologies, but no more than 60 to 70%. Access to critical technologies remains a major challenge that Russia will have to overcome itself, which will take many years.

Regarding the confiscation of Russian assets by the EU, the professor estimates that Russia has already “lost this money two years ago” and that the Russian government views these funds from a long-term perspective. He suggests that Russia is currently focusing on other potentials rather than trying to recover these assets immediately.

In conclusion, Professor Kuvalin paints an optimistic portrait of the Russian economy’s ability to adapt to Western sanctions. He highlights the country’s past experience with economic shocks, the proactive measures adopted by companies and the government, as well as cyclical and strategic external factors. However, the question of access to advanced technologies and uncertainty regarding future competition from its partners underscore potential long-term vulnerabilities. Dependence on national statistical data for inflation assessment is also a point to consider. The response regarding asset confiscation suggests recognition of the loss, but a focus on present and future economic opportunities.

Second Key Witness: Economic Warfare in the Plastics Industry Sector

Joseph Tayefeh is the General Secretary of the Plastalliance union, an interprofessional organization of plastics processors and an essayist. He wrote in 2023 Plastic Bashing: The Hoax? (Cherche Midi editions) which was translated into English in December 2024 under the title Plastic Bashing: Fake News?

In his presentation, he alerts to the consequences of a little-known economic war: the one waged against the French plastics industry.

Mr. Tayefeh emphasizes the central role of plastics processing, at the crossroads of military, health, humanitarian, energy, and agricultural issues—issues that make this sector a strategic playing field for economic warfare.

The French domestic announcements against single-use plastics in particular reveal, according to him, a paradox: while advocating restriction of these plastics, the French government has provided for massive exemptions under decree no. 2022-2 of January 4, 2022, which in reality recognize the indispensable nature of plastic in critical situations—health, humanitarian, or defense. This double discourse weakens manufacturers who lack long-term economic and strategic visibility. Mr. Tayefeh believes that in the absence of a sustainable single-use plastics industry in France, the latter will become dependent on foreign sources during these crisis situations, as illustrated by the COVID-19 episode with masks (which are made of plastic).

Tayefeh illustrates the economic impact of French regulation through a concrete case: that of Pascal Dupré (France’s leading producer of fresh green beans). The application of the decree resulting from the AGEC law (law no. 2020-105 of February 10, 2020, on combating waste and the circular economy) and prohibiting plastic packaging for most fruits and vegetables forced this farmer to abandon plastic packaging, resulting in a cascade of additional costs, agricultural losses, and customer refusals. The switch to paper (supplied for cost reasons by Polish and Italian companies)—promoted as an alternative—resulted in a drop in revenue and jeopardized the company, without an equivalent technical solution. The company previously sourced from a French packaging manufacturer before this regulation.

Finally, Mr. Tayefeh denounces the influence of foreign actors, notably the Heinrich Böll Foundation, funded by Germany, which actively promotes anti-plastic campaigns in France, while carrying broader messages on French energy policy. He sees this as a strategic maneuver aimed at weakening French industry for the benefit of competing interests.

In the context of the international treaty aimed at combating plastic pollution, the refusal to reduce plastic production by major countries in economic, military, or demographic terms (United States, Russia, China, India, South Africa, Gulf countries in particular) should alert, according to Mr. Tayefeh, to the power dynamics at work in environmental policies, and invites reconsideration of plastic as a lever for industrial autonomy and national sovereignty. He concludes with this phrase: “Whoever dominates the plastics industry dominates the world.”

4th Panel: Europe, an Incubator of Economic Warfare?

This session was moderated by Arnaud de Morgny and brought together Gisèle Jourda, Nicolas Ravailhe, Paolo Casaca, and Pascal Legai.

In her presentation, Senator Gisèle Jourda emphasizes the need for increased awareness of the challenges of contemporary economic warfare. She initially notes a paradox: despite growing attention to malicious foreign influences in French parliamentary debates, the economic dimension remains relatively neglected, particularly due to an overly sectoral approach. However, Ms. Jourda recalls that issues of industrial, energy, digital, and food sovereignty have become central to public debate.

While welcoming the Senate’s 2023 report entitled “Reconquering Our Sovereignty Through Economic Intelligence,” and particularly co-rapporteur Marie-Noëlle Lieneman, she considers this initiative still too isolated in the French political landscape. Gisèle Jourda, a member of the Foreign Affairs and European Affairs Committees, then highlights her own work carried out with Senator Pascal Allizard on European mobilization in the face of Chinese power, to illustrate Europe’s potential role as incubator or victim of economic warfare.

The first report, written in 2017, questioned the Chinese “New Silk Roads” strategy, asking whether they represented solely an economic project or the beginning of a new world order. The report already warned of the lack of reciprocity, insufficient environmental compliance, as well as risks related to the debt trap resulting from an opaque Chinese policy mixing investments, grants, and loans. Jourda regretted at that time a European response deemed insufficient in the face of these major challenges.

The second report, published in 2021, highlights the rapid evolution of the situation: China no longer presented itself as an emerging economic actor but as an established global power. The Chinese presence in Europe is then described as significant, diversified, and sometimes concealed. The coronavirus pandemic accentuated negative perceptions of this influence, highlighting both Europe’s economic dependence on China and new assertive forms of Chinese diplomacy (“mask diplomacy,” “Wolf Warriors”).

Gisèle Jourda nevertheless emphasizes a positive evolution: a sharper awareness among European actors as early as 2021, despite an excessive simplification of European discourse toward China, summarized by the triptych “partner, competitor, systemic rival.” The rapporteurs thus propose fourteen recommendations, structured around four main axes: first, countering the means deployed by China in Europe; second, responding to its technological advance; third, developing an appropriate geopolitical strategy in the face of China’s twenty-first-century ambitions; and fourth, building a more equitable commercial relationship with Beijing.

For the senator, it is imperative to abandon all naivety in the face of Chinese power and to assert a strong, autonomous European policy capable of resisting Chinese but also American pressures. She particularly deplores the difficulty in maintaining European unity in the face of Beijing’s aggressive bilateral strategies, as illustrated by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s solitary visit to China in November 2022, refusing President Macron’s proposal to participate jointly.

Finally, the senator calls for in-depth and collective reflection on current European instruments intended to counter China’s aggressive economic strategies, while questioning their effectiveness and sufficiency in the face of contemporary challenges. These issues will, according to her, be the subject of a third report, which she commits to reporting on shortly.

Europe: Incubator and Accelerator of Economic Warfare!

Nicolas Ravailhe is a lawyer with the French Order of Lawyers of the Brussels Bar and a lecturer at the School of Economic Warfare.

In his presentation, Nicolas Ravailhe asserts that the European Union (EU) acts not only as an incubator but also as an accelerator of current economic warfare.

From the outset, Ravailhe recalls the EU’s traditional aversion to geopolitics, preferring to substitute a geo-economic approach. This preference explains the rarity of official use of the term “economic warfare” in Europe, aimed at not alarming public opinion while obscuring the reality of intense competition between member states, particularly from dominant economic powers such as Germany and the Netherlands.

Regarding intra-European economic warfare, N. Ravailhe emphasizes that it is intrinsically linked to the very existence of the internal market, based on the freedoms of movement of capital, goods, services, and persons. He attributes to Werner von Siemens the initial conceptualization of this dynamic, citing the phrase attributed to him: “whoever creates the standard, creates the market.” According to N. Ravailhe, France has long underestimated or misunderstood this strategic logic, which explains its marked economic decline characterized by an intra-European trade deficit that went from 19 billion euros in 2002 to 149 billion euros in 2022. In comparison, the Netherlands saw their surplus grow considerably to reach 326 billion euros during the same period.

Ravailhe also indicates that the European Union is strongly influenced by the ordo-liberalism of Northern European countries, thus imposing economic and legal models that primarily benefit certain member states, particularly Germany. The latter, as a net contributor to the European budget, has effectively used European funds to develop its companies in Eastern Europe, thus ensuring substantial gains without sacrificing its domestic employment. This strategy has nevertheless resulted in a significant loss of economic sovereignty for these countries, despite a relative increase in their GDP.

In contrast, Ravailhe severely criticizes France, denouncing a phenomenon of systematic “plundering” organized by consulting firms serving foreign companies, which skillfully exploit European funds available in France to neutralize any potential national competition. He also notes Italy’s notable successes in obtaining and exploiting these same funds, contrary to prejudices commonly conveyed in France.

On an international scale, Ravailhe observes that the EU strongly associates the notion of power with its trade surpluses, rejecting the traditional idea of economic sovereignty in favor of economic resilience. This approach aims to avoid economic retaliation while preserving a certain technological independence in strategic sectors such as semiconductors.

In its relations with the United States, Europe maintains significant trade surpluses in goods trade (158 billion euros in 2023), tempered however by a significant deficit in services (100 billion euros). N. Ravailhe nevertheless emphasizes the disparity of benefits within the EU itself, with Germany, Italy, and Ireland being particularly favored, Ireland benefiting especially from the establishment of American companies attracted by tax dumping.

As for trade relations with China, N. Ravailhe distinguishes two competing European strategies. On one side, the Netherlands and Belgium massively import Chinese goods to resell them in Europe, which constitutes a major source of deindustrialization for France, confronted with competition deemed unfair. On the other side, Germany produces and exports massively to China, strategically using its Chinese imports as inputs to strengthen its global commercial position, which particularly irritates the United States, concerned with dividing Europeans on this issue, notably through the theme of human rights.

In conclusion, N. Ravailhe calls for urgent awareness in France, advocating a break with an ineffective defensive approach in favor of a coordinated offensive strategy, involving all economic actors: public, private, and territorial. He particularly insists on the importance of actively supporting SMEs and on the essential role that territories can play in this dynamic. Finally, he recalls France’s real assets, such as labor productivity, while warning of the need to act quickly to preserve the French social pact threatened by relative regional economic degradation.

Economic Competition Between European Member States Within the European Space Agency: The Impact of Geographical Return

Major General Pascal Legai is an intelligence officer of the Air and Space Force. He has served as Security Advisor to the Director General of the European Space Agency since 2021.

According to General Legai, the member states of the EU and ESA (English acronym for the European Space Agency) defend above all national and sovereign interests before the collective interest, notably to enable national companies to remain competitive while benefiting from the advantages of various European support mechanisms. In this regard, the European Space Agency’s “geographical return” mechanism, a founding principle of the Agency, is now being challenged, particularly by France, as it is now considered a brake on competitiveness. Adapting “Georeturn” to the evolving economic context appears necessary to face the aggressive methods of non-European competition.

For the general, the geographical return mechanism is the governance model chosen by ESA member states at the creation of ESA in 1975, enabling all member states to increase their scientific and technological level in the space field in support of national companies.

It essentially means that investments made by each ESA member state in the Agency’s activities must generate economic benefits at the national level. This principle encourages member states to invest in space technology and infrastructure development by ensuring they receive tangible benefits in return, such as contracts for satellite manufacturing, launch services, ground infrastructure development, and other related activities.

Overall, geographical return in ESA’s procurement practices has contributed to creating a dynamic and competitive ecosystem of the European space industry, reducing the costs of European space missions through an increased culture of competition, leveraging the strengths of its member states through market expansion and a diversified supplier base, encouraging companies to innovate and develop more efficient technologies and processes, through collaboration and cost sharing.

ESA has thus been able to carry out more cost-effective space missions while generating economic benefits for its member states.

However, geographical return benefits sometimes non-competitive companies and suppliers that do not meet market requirements, especially for important programs such as launchers or significant satellite constellations. The “georeturn” model must therefore be changed, or at least adapted.

General Legai, returning to the rapidly evolving international context, indicates that it requires an adaptation of geographical return.

Indeed, space is asserting itself as a major economic, industrial, and technological challenge. The advent of private actors has led to opening access to space and the use of space data, particularly Earth observation, opening new markets and services, for example in environmental crisis management or the Internet of Things (IoT). Furthermore, the evolution of geopolitical and geo-economic contexts calls into question the idea that the exploration and use of outer space is “the province of all mankind.” Therefore, the continued liberalization of the space sector raises the question of more equitable and sustainable access to space resources and activities. He adds that the growing strategic competition between nations for mastery of space, characterized by the development of sensitive space technologies and military capabilities, notably anti-satellite, leads to a questioning of peaceful use of space, which is becoming an environment in which confrontation appears imminent.

Europe is also experiencing major developments, characterized by the rise of competitors within the European space ecosystem who are progressively investing in all fields of technological competence that were previously held by only a very limited number of states, mainly France (launchers, telecommunications, navigation/positioning, Earth observation, encryption, space surveillance, etc.). Significant tensions appeared in 2022/2023, particularly on the launcher issue (cost overruns and delays for Ariane 6, separation between Avio and Arianespace).

In parallel, the European Union is asserting itself as an essential actor, with the contractualization in December 2024 of the sovereign IRIS constellation.

In the launcher field, the 2023 Seville summit ensured access to space for Europe by supporting the Ariane 6 and Vega-C launchers, while marking the beginning of “Vexit” (the Italian company Avio, industrial prime contractor in the space sector, will thus recover the commercialization of the Vega-C rocket to the detriment of Arianespace). Germany successfully supported the adoption of a competition model by launch operators, while raising questions about the precise definition of selection criteria and access to technologies developed by ESA. Finally, the question of airport control of the Guiana Space Centre (CSG), the European launch operations center for all member countries, becomes decisive.

All these dynamics have a very strong impact on the nature of activities in space, prompting a rethinking of these major strategic areas: access to space and the future of launchers; Earth and Universe sciences; crewed exploration; space telecommunications; intelligence, in-orbit services, and operational action in, toward, and from space; consolidation of the industrial sector—including integration of New Space actors—and skills; governance of space at the European level must be reviewed among the European Commission, EUSPA, ESA, member states, the future of the European space program, security and resilience of space infrastructures, environment and orbit congestion, international cooperation, particularly with the United States.

In conclusion, General Legai specifies that Europe will only be able to face its international competitors if it is united, transcending national interest whenever possible in a strengthened collective vision. Geographical return could give way, by decision of ESA member states, to a “fair return,” meaning that selected companies must meet minimum competitiveness criteria. Competition among European member states nevertheless helps make European companies more competitive. Cohesion and solidarity between the EU, ESA, and their member states are essential.

Conclusion

In conclusion, C. Harbulot first emphasizes the convergence between the concept of economic security as promoted by Anglo-Saxons and actors in the Indo-Pacific zone, which includes an offensive component, and the notion of economic warfare, which itself is developing in the Anglo-Saxon world under the term “economic warfare,” thus extinguishing an old controversy.

He recalls that economic sanctions are only a visible part of economic wars in peacetime and that one must integrate the dialectical relationship that exists between countries that decide on sanctions and the economies of sanctioned countries.

He also specifies the reality of economic confrontations within structured organizations such as the European Union or the European Space Agency.

Finally, he opens four avenues of reflection to deepen the concept:

• Differentiating orders of magnitude between war economy, economic warfare in wartime, and economic warfare in peacetime.
• Differentiating power relationship mechanisms between the market vision and territorial development.
• The transformation of economic power relationships (material world and immaterial world).
• The necessary emulation of circles concerned with this issue (moving beyond restrictive approaches of private operators or state institutions often confined to a purely defensive approach to economic security).

CR451 thanks Lorraine de Juvigny for her assistance.

References

[1] Nechama Janet Cohen Cox, “The Ministry of Economic Warfare and Britain’s conduct of economic warfare, 1939-1945,” Kings College London, King’s College, London, 322 pages.

[2] Georges-Henri Soutou, Gold and Blood: The Economic War Aims of the First World War, Paris, Fayard, 1989.

[3] https://www.defense.gouv.fr/ministere/dossiers-evenementiels-thematiques-du-ministere-armees-anciens-combattants/economie-guerre-produire-plus

[4] Éric Bosserelle, “Economic Warfare, Modern Form of War?” French Journal of Socio-Economics 2011/2 no. 8, Pages 167 to 186. University of Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Regards Laboratory – EA 6292.

[5] Aurélie Poquet (associate researcher at CR451), Economic Warfare in the Plastics and Plastics Processing Sector, downloadable from the CR451 website (www.cr451.fr), November 2024.

[6] Christian Harbulot, The Art of Economic Warfare, Paris, VA éditions, new printing, 2024.

[7] Christian Harbulot, The Economic War Machine: United States, Japan, Europe, Paris, Economica, 1992.

[8] At the regional level before 1945, then global from the 1960s onward.

[9] Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

[10] Japan External Trade Organization.

[11] Deng Xiaoping’s statement during his trip to Japan: “We need to learn from those who have succeeded better than us.”

[12] Benefit of wage costs practiced in Special Economic Zones.

[13] Christian Harbulot, Economic Warfare in the 21st Century, Paris, VA éditions, 2024.

[14] There are numerous translations of the English term “weaponization,” which literally means to transform into a weapon. We have chosen to translate it as “martialization” in order not to refer either to a public power structure as in the term “arsenalization” nor to the military in “militarization.” The essence of “martialization” is that this transformation into a weapon of any medium can be carried out by anyone: civilians or military, private or public persons.

[15] https://www.senat.fr/rap/a23-130-8/a23-130-8-syn.pdf

[16] https://www.frstrategie.org/publications/defense-et-industries/economie-guerre-dela-attentes-besoin-une-reelle-politique-industrielle-defense-2024

[17] War contraband refers to all goods that may transit through a neutral state for the benefit of a belligerent.

[18] https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/fr/ihl-treaties/london-decl-1909/article-24

[19] René Cassin, “The Evolution of Legal Conditions of Economic Warfare,” Foreign Policy journal, 1939, pp. 488-512.

[20] The Davos Forum, created in 1971, aims to bring together multinational CEOs, bankers, political leaders, and influential intellectuals from around the world.

[21] Created in 1999, the G20 is an intergovernmental forum composed of heads of state and government, finance ministers, and central bank governors.

[22] https://www.dictionnaire-academie.fr/article/A9G1672

[23] Contrary to appearances, military victory does not necessarily increase power. It can even become a major weakening factor. Let us take a textbook case from contemporary history. Great Britain was one of the main victors over Nazi Germany. But it emerged exhausted from the five years of military war that ultimately caused it to lose its colonial empire and its status as a great power, to the benefit of another victor: the United States of America.

[24] The fight against foreign smuggling and fraud in border and port regions mobilized 26,000 customs officers, representing 20% of the total number of state agents mobilized in this fight.

[25] Its first target area was the Southwest, former English territory, because a number of Bordeaux producers criticized the measures that prevented them from exporting more of their wine.

[26] David Todd, France’s Economic Identity, Paris, Grasset 2008.